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ABSTRACT
The continuing efforts of several developing nations to acquire nuclear weapons
indicates that the United States may be required to implement a deterrence policy aimed at
authoritarian regimes in the Third World. Therefore. U. S. decision-makers must re-evaluate
the conceptual foundations of American deterrence policy. This research suggests a solution
to the problem of deterring nuclear-capable Third World nations from using nuclear
weapons against the United States, its allies and friends. The new deterrence policy is based
on the theory of omnibalancing which predicts that the Third World dictators are strongly
influenced by perceived internal threats to their regime. Successful deterrence, therefore, is
dependent on holding at risk the mechanisms used by Third World authoritarian regimes to
maintain internal control. Although developing a nuclear deterrence policy against Third
World dictators is critical to the security of the United States, there has been a hesitancy for
Western analysts to consider the problem of Third World nuclear deterrence because they
either perceive that these regimes are irrational and therefore non-deterrable or they believe
that the U.S. nuclear arsenal in itself will provide deterrence. This analysis addresses the
flaws of these perceptions and offers an analytical basis for new U.S. strategic thinking about
deterrence and the Third World. A deterrence policy based on omnibalancing can be a
viable means of preventing Third World nuclear use against the United States and its
interests.
ui
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With the end of the Cold War and the potential for reduced tension between the United
States and the former Soviet Union, there is little likelihood of nuclear warfare between the
superpowers. The recent war in the Middle East and the current focus on the security
threat of nuclear proliferation, however, has introduced a requirement for a different
emphasis in nuclear deterrence. This analysis is a first step in the development of a
deterrence policy aimed at authoritarian regimes in the Third World armed with nuclear
weapons.
A review of the concept of deterrence, reveals that the coercive strategies applicable
to deterring Third World nuclear use are those of denial and punishment. A denial strategy
is defensive in nature. The United States needs technological solutions to the defensive
problem, such as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes in the case of ballistic missile
delivery systems, in combination with conventional preemptive attacks against Third World
nuclear capabilities. The coercive strategy of punishment must threaten the value system of
the targeted regime. The development of this punishment threat is the focus of this study.
It is assumed that the decision-making of the authoritarian leaders is influenced by
the factors described in Steven David's theory of omnibalancing. Specifically, these regimes
perceive that their base of power is vulnerable to internal security threats. A deterrence
policy based on a punishment strategy must take advantage of this perception by targeting
the mechanisms on which the regime relies for internal control. Two methods of internal
control are significant: suppression and economic distribution.
The most common means of suppressing internal opposition is the use of elite security-
forces. Since they are included in the regime's core following, their loyalty can be assumed
to be high. The regime leadership depends on these forces not only to counter domestic
iv
DUDLEY KTfTO: ry
JTAVAL PC ^0L
M01TTBHBY, CAUFOWStlA 93843-8008
Chilian unrest but also to suppress any potential rebellion in the general military forces.
Targeting the control mechanism of suppression translates into threatening to destroy the
elite forces and the command and control network connecting these forces to the regime's
leadership.
Economic distribution as a control mechanism refers to the use of monetary rewards
to ensure loyalty with the implied threat of interruption of financial benefits for disloyal
behavior. This method of control obviously requires a constant flow of wealth to the regime
for subsequent payments. For the majority7 of Third World nations, this source of revenue
is derived from few. if not just one, export product. Targeting the means of economic
distribution translates into attacks on the source, storage or transportation facilities related
to exports.
If implemented, a deterrence policy based on the theory of omnibalancing shares
similarities with the arguments stated by advocates of the Carter administration's justification
for the nuclear targeting shift codified by Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59). Therefore, the
criticisms of PD-59 serve as an applicable test of the viability of omnibalancing for
deterrence.
.An analysis of the requirements for PD-59 revealed a critical intelligence failure in the
U.S. capability for locating counter-control targets. While recent examples of U.S.
interventions in the Third World demonstrated similar shortcomings, the characteristics
inherent in Third World nations indicate that associated intelligence failures are more
dependent upon a lack of committed resources rather than on the nature of the problem.
Third World borders are readily penetrated by technical or human intelligence assets.
Additionally, the control structure in Third World dictatorships is indicative of an
authoritarian regime but not a totalitarian system based on the Soviet model and can
therefore be more readily isolated and identified than could the control mechanisms of the
former Soviet Union. The targeting strategy of PD-59 was also criticized for its questionable
assumption that once the internal control mechanisms were destroyed, the population would
rise up to overthrow the Soviet regime. This criticism may have validity regarding the Third
World. Analyses of American attacks on Libya and Iraq demonstrate the difficulty in
predicting Third World domestic responses to military strikes against the regime. As a
threat, however, deterrence addresses the perceptions of the regime leadership rather than
the desires of the population. In this regard, there is substantial evidence that Third World
leaders behave and make decisions in accordance with the theory of omnibalancing.
Therefore, for the maintenance of deterrence, threatening the possibility for revolt becomes
more significant than the potential for actual rebellion.
Finally, critics of PD-59 argue that the targeting requirements were beyond the actual
U.S. military capability to implement. Additionally, a lack of defense against a Soviet
counter-strike in a situation of Mutual Assured Destruction made deterrence incredible.
Third World regimes do not possess a secure second-strike capability against the United
States. The relatively small size of Third World nations, the concentration of control
mechanisms of suppression and economic distribution in a handful of cities, and vulnerable
nuclear delivery systems result in a targeting strategy that is well within present U.S.
capabilities.
By implementing a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing, the United States would
threaten the overthrow of the aggressor regime through the destruction of the mechanisms
of internal control. There are three conclusions that can be drawn from the development
of a deterrence policy based on this concept: (1) wars waged by the United States against
Third World nuclear powers should be restricted to limited objectives; (2) the distinction
between declaratory policy and employment policy will likely be significant if deterrence fails;
and (3) the Third World perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons can lead to a situation
of mutual deterrence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last four decades, American nuclear deterrence policy has been focused on
the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China. While the number of countries possessing
nuclear weapons remains small, the continuing efforts of several developing nations to
acquire nuclear capabilities indicate that the United States may be required to implement
a deterrence policy aimed at Third World regimes. Therefore, U.S. decision-makers must
re-evaluate the conceptual foundations of American deterrence policy. This research
suggests a solution to the problem of deterring nuclear-capable Third World nations from
using nuclear weapons against the United States, its allies and friends.
A. DEFINING THE THIRD WORLD
To appreciate the nature of the threat these nations pose, it is first necessary7 to defme
what is meant by the term "Third World nuclear regime." The label "Third World" may be
a misnomer considering the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the "Second World."'- The Third
World states included in the membership of the United Nations refer to themselves as the
Group of 77. : Recent literature, however, still refers to the developing nations as the Third
1 Kurt C. Campbell and Thomas G. Weiss argue that with the collapse of Soviet
dominance in Eastern Europe, nations are more accurately described as being members of
either the oil-rich and industrialized "north" or the poor and developing "south." Kurt C.
Campbell and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Third World in the Wake of Eastern Europe," The
Washington Quarterly 14 (Spring 1991): 98.
: Paul Lewis, "Disaster Aid Plan Upsets Third World," New York Times
,
13 November
1991, A4. The term "Group of 77" was first coined in the early 1970's and the number no
longer describes its membership which currently exceeds 100.
1
World. 2 For the purposes of this discussion, the term "Third World" will be used. While
this analysis examines the general behavior of Third World leaders, the focus will be on
authoritarian regimes. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg define an authoritarian
regime as "an arbitrary' and usually a personal government that uses law and the coercive
instruments of the state to expedite its own purposes of monopolizing power and denies the
political rights and opportunities of all other groups to compete for that power." 4 In this
analysis, the label "authoritarian regime," as defined by Jackson and Rosberg, will be used
synonymously with the term "dictatorship."
To determine a pattern of behavior in the Third World, common characteristics must
be found to exist among these nations. One such trait is a former colonial background. It
is true that exceptions to this criteria exist and that a colonial past is not the only recognized
indicator of Third World status. If that were the case, the United States would also be
included in this category. A common colonial experience, however, suggests a shared
political background in Third World authoritarian governments. 5
Former colonial status is the basis for one characteristic that helps explain the decision-
making of Third World dictators: the arbitrariness of national borders. In the majority of
cases, Third World borders were established by the colonizing powers without due regard for
indigenous cultures or ethnic groups. Mohammed Ayoob states that "[d]efined...primarily
by boundaries drawn by the colonial powers... [Third World nations] have not yet developed
1 For a historical review of the origins of the term "Third World," see Leslie Wolf-
Phillips, "Why 'Third World'?: Origin Definition and Usage," Third World Quarterly 9
(October 19S7): 1311 - 1327.
4 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1982), 23.
5 Caroline Thomas lists an ex-colonial status as the primary criteria of Third World
nations. She also includes, however, a degree of social deprivation and a technological
dependence on the industrialized world as additional criteria. Caroline Thomas, In Search
of Security. The Third World in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Runner Publishers,
19S7), 2-3.
the capacity to ensure the habitual identification of their populations with their respective
states...."6 In fact, some ethnic populations were divided by the imposition of borders. One
example of this situation is the Kurdish people of the Middle East who occupy adjacent
territories of Iraq, Iran and Turkey.
The artificiality of these Third World borders results in a narrow support base for the
authoritarian regime. Various subnational groups with differing cultures and social structures
often live within national borders. 7 A domestic political consensus, therefore, rarely exists,
which weakens attempts to form a "national consensus."8 This low level of domestic support
results in the nation's leadership representing the desires of a selected few, if not only one,
of many subnational groups. The ruling regime competes with other social and political
bodies for control of power. Domestic stability is dependent on the success of either the
development of political compromise between groups or the regime's use of coercion to
suppress opposition.
Arbitrary borders and a restricted support base result in weak legitimacy of the Third
World authoritarian leadership. 5 Without the sanction of popular support, a regime ruling
a nation that is not politically or ethnically homogeneous will be perceived as illegitimate by
the majority of the domestic society. This does not imply that internal opposition is united.
Each group, not represented by the ruling party, will support its own leaders and political
goals.
6 Mohammed Ayoob, "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?,"
International Affairs 60 (Winter 1983-1984): 45.
7 Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43 (January
1991): 239.
! Ibid.
5 Ibid., 240.
What emerges from these characteristics is a model of authoritarian Third World
regimes. It is a model of a dictatorship, backed by a minority group, which lacks credibility
and support of the majority of the heterogeneous population. Because of this, the regime
is in a constant struggle to maintain domestic stability. While this model may apply to a
large number of nations, the set of authoritarian states can be reduced further by considering
those regimes with a potential nuclear capability, such as Iran, Iraq or Libya. It is this group
of Third World powers that is the focus of this research.
B. THE NEED FOR NEW THINKING ABOUT DETERRENCE
There are two reasons why developing a nuclear deterrence policy against Third World
dictators is critical to the security of the United States. First, the number of potential Third
World regimes with a capability to produce nuclear weapons is growing. Second, there has
been a hesitancy for Western analysts to consider the problem of Third World nuclear
deterrence because they either perceive that these regimes are irrational and therefore non-
deterrable or they believe that the U.S. nuclear arsenal in itself will provide deterrence. Both
of these issues will be briefly addressed.
1. The Emerging Threat
Presently, only the United States, Great Britain, France, the Commonwealth of
Independent States and China are declared nuclear powers." There is a general consensus
among analysts, however, that Israel has probably between 50-100 nuclear weapons and
South Africa and India have the capability for weapons production. 11 In February 1992, an
official from the Pakistani Foreign Ministry admitted that his country also had acquired the
10 Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of
Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 5.
11 Ibid. India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 and Spector speculates that South
Africa mav have conducted a nuclear test detonation in 1979 with Israeli assistance.
capability to produce an atomic bomb. 12 That same month, Robert M. Gates, the Director
of Central Intelligence, testified before Congress that North Korea may be only a few
months away from possessing nuclear weapons. 13 Iran, Iraq and Libya also have been
acknowledged by analysts to be actively pursuing a nuclear capability.14 Since the end of the
Gulf War, U.N. inspection teams have uncovered evidence suggesting that Iraq was closer
to possessing a nuclear device than Western intelligence sources had previously thought.
In March 1992, there was concern in the Bush administration that Iran may have gained
access to former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons that had been stored in Kazakhstan."
Of all these examples, Iran, Iraq and Libya are perhaps the most worrisome for U.S.
military planners because, in the last decade, all three have been involved in hostilities with
the United States. In fact, a recent study by the Center for Naval Analyses, generated
scenarios recognize these three nations as potential opponents in a future nuclear conflict
with the United States. 1 ' Iraq and Libya also match the model describing authoritarian Third
World regimes. Therefore, due to the recognized nuclear potential of these countries and,
12 Paul Lewis, "Pakistan Tells of Its A-Bomb Capacity," New York Times , S February
1992, 15.
:J Elaine Sciolino, "CIA. Chief Doubts North Korean Vow on Nuclear Arms," New-
York Times
,
26 February 1992, Al and A6. It should be noted that the State Department
disputed Gates's testimony and argued that North Korea would require at least two years
before obtaining a nuclear capability. Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Agencies Split Over North
Korea," New York Times , 10 March 1992, Al and A8.
M Spector with Smith, Nuclear .Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990
,
143.
15 Philip J. Hilts, "Tally of Ex-Soviets' A-Arms Stirs Worry," New York Times , 16
March 1992, A3.
16 Other scenarios with potential American involvement are conflicts between Pakistan
and India and between South Korea and North Korea. Jerome H. Kahan, Hedging Against
the Unthinkable: U.S. Military Responses to Third World Nuclear Crisis
,
Professional Paper
484 (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 1990), 39 - 47.
in the case of Iraq and Libya, the nature of their governments, this discussion will also
emphasize these nations. 17
2. Western Perceptions of Regime Behavior
There are two conflicting arguments concerning the receptiveness of authoritarian
Third World leaders to nuclear deterrent threats. The first proposes that the regime
leadership is incapable of rational decision-making. The second argument is that the
existence of a stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons will deter potential proliferators regardless
of the leadership type. Yet, proponents of these arguments fail to justify their positions with
analytical evidence.
In the late 1970's, advocates of the "irrational regime" argument proposed that
nations newly acquiring nuclear capabilities did not have the benefit of the deterrence
experience of the United States and Soviet Union; the emerging nuclear powers were
immature in regards to nuclear deterrence issues and thus unpredictable and irresponsible
in their decision-making. 1 a Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, echoes this sentiment in
his 1992 Report to Congress.'- 9 The implication of this view was that nuclear weapons in the
hands of these regimes would increase the likelihood for nuclear war. Yair Evron argues this
point concerning the Middle East:
[T]he level of rationality of some of the leaders in the Arab world and the
highly irresponsible behavior of some of the other leaders. ..suggest that
17 One obvious omission in this list of potential Third World nuclear adversaries of the
United States is North Korea. While it is recognized that a nuclear-armed North Korea
must be accounted for in any U.S. deterrence policy, the totalitarian government and
homogeneous population of this state precludes the application of a deterrence policy aimed
at Third World authoritarian regimes. For further discussion on the nature of the North
Korean regime see John Curtis Perry, "Dateline North Korea: A Communist Holdout,"
Foreign Policy SO (Fall 1990): 172-191.
18 Onkar Marwah, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy,"
International Security 2 (Fall 1977): 114.
19 Secretary Cheney described nations such as Iraq as "hostile and irresponsible."
Department of Defense, Report of The Secretary of Defense to the President and the
Congress February 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 7.
nuclear weapons in the Middle East. ..might in fact lead to the first full-
scale nuclear war.../'
Evron's view implies that the irresponsibility of Middle East leaders may lead to inadvertent
nuclear escalation.
Prior to the Gulf War, a slightly different argument was proposed. Advocates of
initiating conflict against President Saddam Hussein of Iraq justified their position by
emphasizing the despicable nature of the Iraqi leader. Once Hussein acquired nuclear
weapons, he would not be deterred from their use because he was "not constrained by
conscience"21 or by neither "international law, nor traditional norms of international
behavior...."22 Dr. William R. Graham stated in Congressional testimony: "[Saddam
Hussein] has demonstrated his disregard for. ..standards of civilized behavior...." 25 The
implication of these views is that Hussein is non-deterrable.
Contrasting these assessments of Third World leadership behavior is an argument
that these regimes, armed with nuclear weapons, will behave no differently than would be
expected of the superpowers. Kenneth N. Waltz proposes that the mere possession of
nuclear weapons leads to rationality in decision-making:
[Many] analysts emphasize the importance of w/jo the new nuclear states
will be and dwell on the question of whether their rulers will be
'rational'.. .Nuclear peace depends not on rulers and those around them
2C Yair Evron, "Nuclear Weapons for Israel?," Commentary 61 (February 1976): 6.
11 Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Crisis in the Persian Gulf:
Sanctions. Diplomacy and War , 101st Cong., 2d sess., 4-6, 12-14, 17, 19-20 December 1990,
49.
22 Congress, Senate. Committee on Armed Services, Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region:
U.S. Policy Options and Implications . 101st Cong.. 2d sess., 11, 13 September, 27-30
November, 3 December 1990. 537.
22 Ibid.
being rational but on their aversion to running catastrophic risks.24
This statement implies that the American nuclear deterrence policy designed for the Soviets
may apply to other nations as well. Waltz states:
[New] nuclear states will confront the possibilities and feel the constraints
that present nuclear states have experienced.. .Nations that have nuclear
weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly. ..Because they do,
the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than
feared. 2
!
Therefore, the emergence of new nuclear-armed nations, according to Waltz, is not cause
for re-examining U.S. deterrence policy.
Waltz's conclusion that nuclear proliferation is potentially beneficial has been
supported empirically by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker. 26 While they do
not advocate widespread proliferation, they conclude that a situation in which adversaries are
both armed with nuclear weapons can theoretically increase the prospects for peace. 27
Zbigniew Brzezinski. former National Security Advisor to President Carter, argues along
these lines in regards to a future nuclear-armed Iraq. "Israel already has nuclear weapons
and can thus deter Iraq, while the United States has certainly both the power to deter or to
destroy Iraq. Deterrence has worked in the past ...," 28 The implication of Brzezinski's
claims is not intuitively accurate. The nuclear deterrence policy aimed at the former Soviet
Union was based on more than just the existence of American nuclear weapons. It was
2< Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better , Adelphi
Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981), 21. Emphasis
in original.
25 Ibid., 30.
28 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of
Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (June 1982): 283 - 306.
27
Ibid., 306.
28 Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,
Part I . 101st Cong., 2d sess., 4-5 December 1990, 171.
focused on threatening the Soviet's values. For example, the 19S3 Report of the President's
Commission on Strategic Forces defines deterrence of the Soviet Union in the following way:
Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to simple quantification.
Still less is it a mirror image of what would deter ourselves. Deterrence
is the set of beliefs in the minds of the Soviet leaders, given their own
values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It requires us to
determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering
aggression, even in a crisis - not to determine what would deter us.29
This definition of deterrence conflicts with both Waltz's and Brzezinski's assessments in that
it calls for tailoring a deterrence strategy to the perceptions and values of the regime being
deterred. It would be expected that the value system of a Third World dictatorship differs
from that influencing the behavior of decision-makers in the United States or the former
Soviet Union.
C. A DETERRENCE POLICY FOR THE THIRD WORLD
Given the threat of nuclear proliferation, this analysis addresses the development of a
nuclear deterrence policy directed at Third World dictatorships. It rejects both the
arguments that these regimes are non-deterrable and that the mere existence of an American
nuclear arsenal will satisfy future deterrence requirements. A deterrence policy for emerging
Third World nuclear powers must threaten what these regimes value. This translates into
holding at risk the mechanisms these regimes use to maintain internal control.
In order to determine the value system of Third World authoritarian regimes, it is
necessary to understand what influences their behavior. One theory that attempts to provide
this understanding is termed "omnibalancing." It describes Third World decision-making
as a balance between internal and external threats to regime security. It is Third World
dictators' preoccupation with internal threats that provides the United States with the targets
15 Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces , By Brent Scowcroft,
Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19S3), 3.
to hold at risk in a situation of deterrence. For successful deterrence, the Third World
authoritarian regime must perceive a credible threat to the mechanisms it uses to maintain
internal control.
This suggested deterrence policy implies that if the United States becomes involved in
a military conflict with these authoritarian states, it will be restricted to waging a limited
war. This is because the deterrent threat must raise the perceived costs of using nuclear
weapons higher than any potential benefits in the mind of the Third World leadership. By
threatening internal control mechanisms, the cost of using nuclear weapons would be the
overthrow of the regime. Therefore, in order to preserve the credibility of this threat, the
United States would need to restrict its attacks so the resulting destruction is proportionate
with limited objectives. Unrestricted warfare on the part of the United States, would leave
no available targets that could be perceived by the Third World dictator as threatened in the
event of Third World nuclear use.
There are significant limitations to basing a deterrence policy on the theory of
omnibalancing. One limitation is that the theory may not have universal applicability
throughout the set of authoritarian nuclear regimes in the Third World. These nations have
important differences along economic, political, cultural and ethnic lines. It is not intuitively
obvious that one theory7 could accurately encompass these differences.
.Another potential limitation concerns the communication of the deterrent threat. There
are significant cultural and social differences between these Third World nations and the
United States. It will be a greater challenge to ensure accurate threat signalling than it was
in regards to the former Soviet Union. Over the last four decades, American and Soviet
leaders reached considerable understanding of the other's behavior."
,c Stephen Van Evera proposes that the bipolar Cold War relationship between the
United States and Soviet Union made it easier to "establish 'rules of the game' and agreed
spheres of influence." Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,"
International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 34.
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D. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this analysis will describe and justify the policy for deterring Third
World nuclear regimes that has been outlined in the preceding discussion. The next chapter
discusses the concept of deterrence and how it is applied to prevent the use of nuclear
weapons. The requirements of effective deterrence will be introduced with an emphasis on
how they can be satisfied in reference to Third World dictatorships. Then, based on the
U.S. experience of the Cold War, the coercive strategies available to the United States will
be enumerated.
The third chapter introduces the concept of omnibalancing and the potential for using
it to determine the value priorities of Third World authoritarian regimes. After identifying
the means by which these regimes maintain their internal security, a targeting strategy will
be proposed for implementation of a nuclear deterrence policy.
In the fourth chapter, a comparison is drawn between a deterrence policy based on the
theory of omnibalancing and the nuclear targeting doctrine of Presidential Directive 59
(PD-59). It is argued that the perception of Soviet values that formed the basis of PD-59
is similar to the Third World value system described by omnibalancing. A review of the
criticisms of PD-59, therefore, serves as an applicable test of the viability of omnibalancing
for deterrence in the Third World.
The final chapter reviews the findings of the thesis and presents three significant
conclusions. These are: (1) wars waged by the United States against the Third World
nuclear powers should be restricted to limited objectives; (2) the distinction between
declaratory policy and employment policy will likely be significant if deterrence fails; and (3)
the Third World perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons can lead to a situation of
mutual deterrence. The chapter concludes with recommendations for further study in the
area of nuclear deterrence against Third World dictators.
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II. REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRING THIRD WORLD DICTATORS
A variety of scholars have assigned different interpretations to the term deterrence. 1
Simply put, as Patrick M. Morgan states, deterrence is "the use of threats of harm to prevent
someone from doing something you do not want him to do." : Morgan's definition is general
enough to include threats to prevent an adversary from taking undesired political, economic
or military action. The focus of deterrent threats in this discussion, however, is the
prevention of the use of nuclear weapons by Third World regimes. 3 Therefore, the object
of deterrence is limited to persuading an aggressor, through the use of threats, that the cost
of using nuclear assets is higher than any potential benefits gained by their use.'
Since the object of deterrence is to prevent aggression, the defending nation initiating
a deterrent threat places the decision for action on the aggressor.' The defender is
1 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual .Analysis (London: Sage Publications,
1977), 17 - 24.
1 Ibid., 17.
3 The emphasis of deterrence on a potential military attack (i.e. use of nuclear weapons)
is in keeping with the assumptions of contemporary" deterrence theory. Alexander L. George
and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in .American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 78.
4 Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1988), 15. Huth defmed the deterrent threat as one of retaliation. It will
be argued that the term "retaliation" has special meaning and, in fact, is more appropriately
used in reference to compellent threats.
5 Thomas C. Schelling, .Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1966),
71.
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interested in maintaining a status quo and threatens reaction to the aggressor's challenge
to the situation. A deterrent policy can therefore be described as defensive. 6
A significantly different concept is that of compellence. In a compellent situation, the
defender's objective is to coerce the aggressor into taking a desired action. 7 A policy of
compellence requires a defender to initiate action to force a change of the status quo.
Therefore, compellence can be regarded as offensive.' Some analysts postulate that
situations of compellence more often lead to armed conflict than deterrence situations. 9
One reason given for this phenomenon is that compellent threats are issued under conditions
of high expectations of war whereas deterrent threats are made in an opposite atmosphere. 1 "
Besides the difference of which side initiates action, deterrence and compellence can
also be contrasted in terms of timing of the defender's threats. Deterrent threats, since they
enforce a status quo, can remain in use indefinitely. The timing of carrying out compellent
threats, in contrast, can be critical. Once an aggressor has taken an action undesired by the
defender there is a definite period of ti^ne in which compellent threats will succeed. Thomas
Schelling states, "Too little time [after the aggressive action], and compliance becomes
impossible; too much time, and compliance becomes unnecessary." 11 Finally, deterrence and
compellence differ in the point of the confrontation when success can be measured. Since
deterrence is preventative, deterrence policy focuses on the initial phase of the conflict.
s Ibid., 78. As Schelling argues, to think of deterrence as defensive does not imply that
deterrence is synonymous with defense or a defensive military strategy.
7 Ibid., 70-71.
8 Ibid., 78.
9 Walter J. Peterson, "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of
Conventional Wisdom," International Studies Quarterly 30 (September 1986): 279 - 282.
10 Ibid., 286.
11 Schelling, 72.
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Compellence requires the aggressor to reverse actions already taken. Therefore, the success
of compellence is realized in the final stage of the conflict, after the aggressor has fully
complied with the defender's demands. 12
Even with these apparent differences, the concepts of deterrence and compellence may
be confused. The recent Gulf War and the events leading to its initiation provide an
excellent example. Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, argues that the Gulf War provided insightful lessons concerning
deterrence of Third World authoritarian regimes:
Saddam Hussein was non-deferrable...The buildup of American Forces in the
Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Shield would have convinced any Soviet
leader that the Americans were serious and it was time to back off. However, the
overwhelming threat of force did not compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from
Kuwait..."
By citing the buildup of allied forces, Aspin is certainly evaluating a failure of coalition
compellence policy. He wrongly concludes that compellence failure demonstrates Hussein
was non-deterrable. Aspin fails to recognize that the deterrent value of Operation Desert
Shield was the threat against an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. 14 While Iraqi forces did not
enter Saudi Arabia before commencement of combat, it is difficult to ascertain whether this
was the result of successful deterrence."
1: Ibid., 75.
13 Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990's: Defining a New Basis for U. S. Military
Forces," Speech before the Atlantic Council of the United States, 6 January7 1992, 8,
emphasis added.
H President George Bush justified the initial deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia
stating. "I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its
homeland. ..U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to
preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression." "Excerpts From
Bush's Statement on U.S. Defense of Saudis," New York Times , 9 August 1990, A15.
15 Richard K. Herrmann proposes that Hussein may never have intended to invade
Saudi territory. Richard K. Herrmann, "The Middle East and the New World Order:
Rethinking U. S. Political Strategy after the Gulf War," International Security 16 (Fall 1991):
52.
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A. TYPES OF DETERRENCE
The definition of deterrence can be refined further by considering the immediacy of
the threat of aggression. Immediate deterrence refers to coercive threats against an
aggressor expected to be preparing an imminent attack. 16 It is a crisis situation that makes
immediate deterrence necessary and, therefore, the time for the defender's policy
formulation is critically compressed. 17
General deterrence is the term describing a relatively longer-term policy aimed at a
historical adversary when the threat of immediate aggression is low. 18 An example of U.S.
general deterrence policy is the decades of NATO deterrence against the now defunct
Warsaw Treaty Organization. Since general deterrence implies a long-standing relationship
between adversaries, there is an opportunity for the defender to develop economic and
political deterrence policies rather than relying on the threatened use of military force.' 9
Deterrence can be further broken down in terms of the relationship between the
defender and the object of the aggressor's attack. A policy deterring an attack upon the
defender's own territory is termed central deterrence. An attempt to prevent an aggressor
from attacking an ally of the defender is called extended deterrence. 2 ' In deterrence
literature, central and extended deterrence have been referred to as Type I and Type II
11 A useful example for a failure of immediate deterrence can be found in the Gulf War
experience. Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States attempted to send a
deterrence signal to Hussein through diplomacy and publicized military exercises with Gulf
allies. Ibid., 51 - 52.
17 Morgan, 28.
11 Ibid., 29. Morgan argued that immediate deterrence situations are infrequent but
illogicaUy serve as the basis for much of contemporary deterrence theory.
19 Ibid.
20 Huth, 16.
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deterrence respectively. 21 Both central and extended deterrence can be either immediate or
general. Finally, deterrence can be described in terms of the point in a crisis at which it is
applied. A deterrence policy aimed at preventing an attack can be referred to as pre-war
deterrence. If, however, the deterrent threat is meant to prevent escalation of conflict once
it has begun, the policy is described as intra-war deterrence.22
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRENCE
Nearly forty years ago, William W. Kaufmann described the requirements for successful
deterrence:
To achieve [deterrence] it becomes necessary to communicate in some way to a
prospective antagonist what is likely to happen to him should he create the
contingency in question. The expectation is that, confronted with this prospect,
he will be deterred from moving in directions that are regarded as inimical, at least
so long as other less intolerable alternatives are open to him.23
Kaufmann 's argument can be refined to the following list of requirements for deterrence:
(1) the defender's threat is credible; (2) the defender's threat is communicated effectively
to the aggressor; (3) the aggressor recognizes the costs of attack are higher than any
potential benefits; and (4) the defender and aggressor are rational. 2 ' Described in this
manner, the requirements imply that a successful deterrence policy is dependent on the
21 Herman Kahn. On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961),
126. Kahn also referred to a Type III deterrence, a threat of graduated response to a
limited attack.
22 Kahn, 175. For discussions of the implications of intra-war deterrence in a nuclear
conflict, see Stephen J. Cimbala and Joseph D. Douglass, ed.. Ending a Nuclear War
(London: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishing Inc., 1988).
25 William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in William W. Kaufmann,
ed., Military Policy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 17.
u Henry Kissinger, The Necessity' for Choice (New York: Harper and Brothers,
Publishers, 1960), 40 - 41. George and Smoke list three requirements that concern the
formulation and issuance of the defender's threat. Rationality and the aggressor's
cost/benefit analysis are described as an assumption and a condition respectively rather than
as requirements for deterrence. George and Smoke 64. 73, 522 - 530.
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perceptions and decisions of both the aggressor and defender. Therefore, it is improbable
that threats can be formulated in general terms and utilized in a variety of conflict situations.
An understanding of the requirements for deterrence will assist in the development of the
specific threats necessary to prevent Third World nuclear use.
1. Threat Credibility
The credibility of a defender's threat depends upon a dynamic process influenced
by the decision-making and perceptions of both the aggressor and defender. For purposes
of discussion, threat credibility can be divided into either elements dependent on the
aggressor or those dependent on the defender. The defender's contribution can be further
broken down into structural and behavioral influences
.
:! Structural effects include the
military balance and the defender's value system. Behavioral influence refers to the
defender's reputation.
The aggressor can affect the credibility of a defender's threat by its decision on
which military strategy to initiate. The options available can be defmed as: (1) quick
decisive; (2) test of capabilities; (3) coercive diplomacy; and (4) attrition." A quick decisive
strategy entails the use of sufficient force to occupy disputed territory or destroy a specified
amount of the opponents military capability." A test of capabilities has two facets. The first
is a limited probing strategy by which an aggressor incurs minor military action to test the
25 Huth, 34.
" Alexander L. George, "The Development of Doctrine and Strategy," in Alexander L.
George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, ed., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos,
Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 16 - 21.
27 Defined in this way, a quick decisive strategy includes George's meaning as well as
George and Smoke's description of the fait accompli deterrence failure and Huth's
descriptions of the limited arms and rapid offensive attack strategies. George and Smoke,
536 and Huth, 35 - 36. John J. Mearsheimer refers to the quick decisive strategy as the
blitzkrieg strategy. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 19S3), 29 - 30.
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defender's commitment. 28 The second facet is that of circumventing the defender's deterrent
capabilities by exploiting perceived vulnerabilities in the defender's commitments. 25 Coercive
diplomacy describes a strategy which incrementally escalates a military conflict forcing the
defender to establish repeatedly its commitment against continued aggression.' Finally,
Alexander George defines an attrition strategy as "prolonged warfare under a set of
conditions or limitations on military operations that give neither side a clear advantage.""
The different attack strategies available to the aggressor demonstrate that a
defender's threat must be appropriate to the type of attack for the threat to be credible. 12
The defender must tailor the threatened response to the aggressor's attack strategy. This
is not meant to imply that the defender must respond to even,7 possible aggressive action.' 1
It does follow, however, that a single deterrent threat will not be successful over the
spectrum of attack strategies.
The attack strategy represents the aggressor's influence on the credibility of
deterrent threats. The defender affects credibility through structural and behavioral means.
28 George and Smoke, 540 - 543.
28 Ibid., 545. George and Smoke offer the examples of the Berlin crises of 195S and
1961. The aggressor (the Soviet Union) recognized the defender's (the United States)
commitment to resisting a direct attack on West Berlin but attempted to work around that
by implementing a less threatening blockade.
)C George, 18 - 19.
" Ibid., 19. Mearsheimer proposes the objective of the attrition strategy is to wear
down the opponent's defenses until resistance becomes impossible. Mearsheimer, 29.
52 This was the basis of one of the criticisms of the Eisenhower administration's doctrine
of massive retaliation which threatened nuclear attack in response to any form of Communist
(i.e. Soviet) aggression. See Maxwell P. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper
and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), 5 - 10.
52 The defender's decision of whether or not to respond is influenced by the concept
of reputation which will be discussed.
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Structurally, credibility depends on the military balance and the relative value to the defender
of the object of threatened attack. 3 *
The military balance aspect of structural credibility is relatively obvious. The
deterrent threat is incredible if the defender does not have the military forces necessary to
resist an attack. While the defender's required military capability may appear obvious, this
will not always be the case. In fact, the requirements for adequate defense may be
significantly less than what would be assumed necessary based on the aggressor's military
capabilities.
An example is the U.S. effort to defend against a Soviet invasion of Iran in the
early 1980's. Alarmed by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter
used his 1980 State of the Union Address as a vehicle to issue a deterrent threat against
further Soviet encroachment in the Middle East. "An attempt by any outside force to gain
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the
United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force." 35 This threat, later referred to as the Carter Doctrine, led to the
development of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), an intraservice U.S. military command
designed for quick response to Iran in time of crisis." One criticism of the RDF concept
was that it was numerically inadequate to oppose the Soviet military potential in the region.
The RDF of approximately four divisions would potentially face twenty-four Soviet
divisions. 37 Based on a Department of Defense estimate, in the first thirty days of conflict,
u Huth, 34.
15
"Transcript of President's State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress,"
New York Times , 24 January 1980, A12.
JS Joshua M. Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent,"
International Security 6 (Fall 1981): 126 - 127.
" Ibid., 127.
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U.S. troops would be outnumbered five to one. 18 The implications of these statistics is that
the military imbalance made Carter's threatened response incredible. Joshua M. Epstein,
however, argues that the regional military balance was not a critical determinant of the
deterrent potential of the RDF. In a detailed military analysis of the Soviet invasion
scenario, Epstein concludes that the geography of the invasion route and the consequent
limitations on Soviet attack options resulted in the likelihood that a properly trained and
deployed RDF, though numerically inferior, could have effectively opposed a Soviet
invasion. 1 ' Perhaps even more significant to this discussion, Epstein argues that Soviet
planners were aware of this situation as well. 40
The defender's value assessment is the most ambiguous of the structural elements.
The defender must perceive that the object being threatened by the aggressor is of high
enough interest to warrant an attempt at deterrence. Some empirical analyses of deterrence
cases have postulated that economic, political, or military interdependence between the
threatened state and defender leads to a credible deterrent situation/ 1 It is also possible,
however, for a defender to commit resources for deterrence when there is no measurable
interest at risk. 4:
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force," International
Security 5 (Spring 198 1): 59.
3
- Epstein, 126 - 15S.
40 Ibid., 147.
41 Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 -
1980," World Politics 36 (July 1984): 514 - 520. For a critical assessment of this work, see
Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,"
World Politics 43 (April 1990): 336 - 369.
42 Robert Jervis argues this point concerning the United States interest in curbing
nuclear proliferation. He cites a potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan.
American intervention would be "less for narrow concerns about U. S. security than for the
desire to spare other countries the horrors of nuclear war." Robert Jervis, "The Future of
World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?," International Security 16 (Winter 1991/92):
67.
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Regardless of what is considered an interest to the defender, it is clear the
perception of this value assessment on both sides is critical to threat credibility. A
deterrence situation thus becomes a question of an imbalance of interests. 43 Robert Jervis
argues, "[T]he higher the value a state places on prevailing on an issue, the higher the risks
it will be willing to run to do so. Thus the side that has more of a stake in an issue can
make more credible threats to stand firm."44 When the interests of both sides are
asymmetrical in favor of the defender, a deterrent threat is credible/ 5
The behavioral aspect of threat credibility refers to the reputation of the defender
in past crises. 46 Some states may have acquired the reputation of being more resolute or
more reckless than others. 47 A deterrent threat, therefore, may be inherently credible based
solely on who is making it. Additionally, a defender may feel pressured to make deterrence
policy decisions in order to preserve or initiate a reputation of resolve. 48
While reputation may influence credibility, there are analytical obstacles to a
defender relying on reputation to enhance deterrence. The most basic of these is the fact
43 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1989), 30.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Huth also included the adoption of diplomatic strategies and movement of military
forces by the defender as behavioral elements. While these actions may add to threat
credibility, a discussion of them will be deferred to that dealing with communicating a
deterrent threat. Huth, 34.
47 Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7 (Winter
1982/83): 9.
41 Barry Nalebuff used the example of President John F. Kennedy's statement regarding
the 1961 Berlin crisis to make this point. "If we do not meet our commitments to Berlin,
where will we later stand? If we are not true to our word there, all that we have achieved
in collective security, which relies on these words, will mean nothing." Barry Nalebuff.
"Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43 (April 1991): 315.
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that reputation is only significant in the perception of the aggressor/' It matters little in
how the defender perceives its own reputation because the aggressor may have a different
historical perspective. Another problem with the concept of reputation is to whom the
reputation becomes attached." It may be become difficult for a democracy to maintain a
reputation through succeeding administrations when they represent different political parties.
It may also be difficult for an authoritarian Third World regime to expect to retain its
reputation after a dictator dies. The fundamental problem with reputation is that it has
many sources including individual, regime, national and government. It is unlikely that both
the defender and aggressor will recognize it in the same manner.
2. Signalling the Threat
Once a defender formulates a deterrence policy, and determines a credible threat,
both the threat and conditions for its implementation must be communicated to the
aggressor. As with perceptions of threat credibility, signalling a deterrent threat must be
evaluated from the aspects of both the defender and the aggressor. The signal must be
clearly sent through declarations or actions and must be unambiguously received.11
In order to send a coherent signal, the defender must first recognize who on the
opponent's side needs to receive the message. 52 This will determine the most effective
signalling method to be used. 53 Once the target of the signal is identified, the defender must
< 5 Ibid., 316.
!C Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," 9.
51 George and Smoke, 60.
52 Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the
Vietnam Conflict 1964 - 196S (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 13.
J] If the aggressor regime is centrally controlled, the leadership may be the best target
for a deterrent signal. In cases of decentralized control, particularly in a crisis, it may be
critical that the aggressor's military leaders receive the signal.
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decide which of the aggressor's attack options is being opposed. 5 * Finally, the method of
transmitting the signal must be chosen.
There are two methods of signalling a deterrent threat available to the defender:
Verbal declarations or military actions." Declaratory signalling refers to statements of
government officials or military officers which are intended to be received by the aggressor
regime. Action signalling is primarily concerned with the use of military force. Two
methods of action signalling are possible: changing the disposition of armed forces; and
providing military assistance." The disposition of armed forces can be reduced into
movement, activity or readiness. 5 " Minor changes in the disposition of forces can enforce
a general deterrence policy. Significant changes, however, appear to be more applicable in
immediate deterrence situations. Schelling argues that, "It is in the wars that we have come
to call 'limited wars' that the bargaining [through military action] appears most vividly and
is conducted most consciously." 58 Therefore, the actual use of military firepower is
especially applicable in cases of intra-war deterrence and compellence.
There are two types of problems that arise regarding signalling deterrent threats.
These are technical and perceptual and can be applied to declaratory or action signalling."
" George and Smoke, 561.
55
Ibid., 561 - 565.
56 Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington, D. C:
The Brookings Institution, 1978) 7 - 12. See also Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 20 - 26.
" Blechman and Kaplan included the following in military activity: "[T]he use of
firepower, the establishment or disestablishment of a permanent or temporary presence
abroad; a blockade; an interposition; and exercise or demonstration; the escort or transport
of another actor's armed forces or material; a visit by a military unit to a foreign location;
an evacuation; the operation or reconnaissance patrol, or surveillance units in a non-exercise
context; or a change in readiness status." Ibid., 12 - 13.
58 Schelling, 142.
" Thies, 406.
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Technical problems originate with the defender and refer to difficulties in articulating the
desired threat." Declarations may lack the specificity required to enable the aggressor to
recognize the threat. Similar to the problems of threat credibility, non-specificity results
from communicating a general threat to cover a variety of attack options." Additionally, in
bureaucratic western administrations such as that in the United States, it is not always
possible to identify which spokesman represents the official government position. The
declaratory policy becomes confused as many voices attempt to interpret and articulate it.' 2
Technical problems associated with action signalling are the same difficulties inherent
whenever military force is employed. Unforeseen variables such as weather, equipment
malfunction or personnel error impede the successful application of armed force.'- 3
Similar to technical problems, perceptual impediments to signalling result in a
failure of the aggressor to receive the deterrent threat. The difference, however, is that
unlike the technical side, perceptual problems are not due to the failure of the defender to
transmit a coherent signal. Rather, they are due to the aggressor not interpreting the signal
as desired by the defender
,
H This is particularly applicable to situations when military action
is used to communicate the threat. In that case, there are two types of perceptual problems.
" Ibid., 346.
61 William W. Kaufmann addresses this point in his criticism of the 1954 speech of John
Foster Dulles which outlined the Eisenhower adrninistration's policy of "massive retaliation."
Kaufmann, 12 - 38.
" Thies, 13.
» Ibid., 406.
M Thies proposes that it is the misperceptions of both sides that leads to this type of
signaling failure. Ibid. See also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
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The first type is the aggressor simply receiving the wrong message from the action
taken." One example of this is the use of the movement of naval forces to signal
commitment and deterrence. 6 ' It has been argued that navies are particularly suited for
signalling threats because of their inherent flexibility of movement. 67 Naval forces can be
easily deployed to a crisis region or withdrawn to avoid unnecessary escalation.88 In contrast
to this view, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan argue:
[F]orces actually emplaced on foreign soil were more frequently associated
with positive [political] outcomes than were naval forces, which can
withdrawn almost as easily as they can be moved toward the disturbed
area. The movement of land based forces...involves real economic costs
and a certain psychological commitment that are difficult to reverse... 89
Therefore, the flexibility inherent in naval forces may actually send a signal of non-
commitment to potential aggressors.
The second type of perceptual problem for threat signalling occurs during
situations of intra-war deterrence. The aggressor may have difficulty distinguishing the
signal from other ongoing military action: In this situation, it is not a question of the
aggressor perceiving the wrong signal, it is a case of the aggressor perceiving no signal at all.
The recent Gulf War provides an applicable example of the difficulties in signaling
a deterrent threat, particularly to a Third World authoritarian regime. One goal of coalition
8! Thies, 296 - 29S.
88 Charles D. Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime (Washington, D. C: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 19S0), 15 - 29.
87 H. Laurence Garrett III, ADM Frank B. Kelso II, USN and GEN A.M. Gray, USMC,
"The Way Ahead," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 117 (April 1991): 38.
88 Isaac C. Kidd, "For the Alliance, Seapower is an Anchor of Stability in an Unstable
World," Seapower (January 1992): 36. See also Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis:
Four Case Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), ix - 56.
89 Blechman and Kaplan, 529.
,c Thies uses the example of American escalatory bombing campaigns against North
Vietnam to demonstrate this point. Thies, 297 - 29S.
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deterrence both before and during the conflict was to prevent Iraqi forces under Saddam
Hussein from using chemical weapons against coalition troops. Whether the threats were
effective may never be known. But more importantly for this discussion, is how successful
the coalition led by President George Bush was in communicating their intentions.
It is clear that the Bush administration consistently warned Saddam Hussein of
some form of retaliation if Iraq attacked coalition forces with chemical weapons.71 In an
31 August 1990 interview, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of coalition
forces in Southwest Asia, warned that if Iraq used chemical weapons, "They will pay for it
big time."7: James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, echoed Schwarzkopf's sentiment on 29
October 1990. "[Saddam Hussein] must also realize that should he use chemical or
biological weapons, there will be the most severe consequences."73 In a letter to Hussein,
which was subsequently released to the press on 12 January 1990, Bush stated, "[T]he United
States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons... .You and your country
will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable actions of this sort."74 Finally in a 5
February 1991, press conference, President Bush was asked if the U.S. might retaliate in
kind to a chemical attack. He answered:
Well, I think it's better to never say what option you may be considering
or may or may not do. ..[Saddam Hussein] ought to think very carefully
about [using chemical weapons]...And I will leave that up to a very fuzzy
interpretation because I would like to have every possible chance that he
71
It should be noted that the following analysis is based exclusively on the public
statements of coalition officials. There is a possibility that private communications were also
issued. The effect of this means of declaratory signalling is obviously unknown.
72 Michael R. Gordon, "No War Unless Iraq Strikes, U. S. Gulf Commander Says," New
York Times , 1 September 1990, 16.
73 Thomas L. Friedman, "Bush and Baker Explicit in Threat to Use Force," New York
Times , 30 October 1990, A12.
u
"Text of Letter From Bush to Hussein," New York Times , 13 January 1990, 19.
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decides not to do this. 75
This "fuzzy interpretation" may have led Schwarzkopf and others to later speculate about a
deterrent threat of nuclear retaliation. 76 By leaving the specific means of retaliation
ambiguous, Bush was providing uncertain variables for Hussein's calculus of war. Clearly,
if Hussein had been sure of the coalition response, he could accurately assess the risks of
using chemical weapons.
The means of U.S. retaliation, however, may not have been as ambiguous as Bush
implied. Some post-war analysts argued that the tremendous conventional superiority
enjoyed by the coalition forces precluded any need or desire from considering chemical or
nuclear weapons in answer to a chemical attack. 77 While this argument may have been valid
after observing the results of the initial air campaign, it was not as readily apparent before
the war began. The balance of forces between the coalition and Iraq was certainly different
in August 1990, when Schwarzkopf declared his threat, than in February 1991, when Bush
held his press conference.
There is evidence, however, indicating that President Bush may have been
politically restrained from considering a chemical or nuclear response. This restraint grew
out of a fear of the potential international reaction to the use, even in retaliation, of weapons
of mass destruction. At a time when the Bush administration was trying to define a "new
world order," it would have been counterproductive to be forced to justify chemical or
75
"Excerpts from Talk by Bush on Gulf War," New York Times, 6 February 1991, A10.
76 On February 27, 1991, Schwarzkopf proposed, "There's [sic] other people who are
speculating that the reason [the Iraqi forces] didn't use chemical weapons is because they're
afraid that if they use their chemical weapons there would be nuclear retaliation." "Excerpts
from Schwarzkopf News Conference on Gulf War," New York Times
,
28 February 1991, AS.
McGeorge Bundy interpreted the cited 12 January 1990 letter as a "veiled but powerful
warning" of nuclear retaliation for Iraqi chemical use. McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons
and the Gulf," Foreign Affairs 70 (Fall 1991): 84 - 85.
77 Neil C. Livingstone, "Iraq's Intentional Omission," Seapower (June 1991): 30.
27
nuclear use. On 8 August 1990, President Bush was questioned at a news conference
regarding potential Iraqi chemical attack. He stated, "I would think that [Hussein would]
know that, given the way the world views the use of chemical weapons, that it would be
intolerable and that it would be dealt with very, very severely."78 There is an implication in
that statement, that world opinion may not have tolerated any use of chemicals, even in
retaliation. At the time of this news conference, many military analysts believed that the risk
of losing international support for the coalition was high enough to preclude U.S. chemical
or nuclear use."
Two months later, Bush supplied further evidence that he was not considering
chemical or nuclear retaliation. The arena for his remarks was the United Nations General
Assembly.
As a world community, we must act, not only to deter the use of
inhumane weapons like mustard and nerve gas, but to eliminate the
weapons entirely...We must also redouble our efforts to stem the spread
of nuclear weapons, biological weapons and the ballistic missiles that can
reign destruction upon distant peoples. The United Nations can help
bring about a new day - a day when these terrible weapons and the
terrible despots who would use them, or both, were a thing of the past.80
The United States use of chemical or nuclear weapons would have jeopardized the possibility
of achieving Bush's aims. Therefore, it appears that Bush never seriously considered
chemical or nuclear retaliation. In support of this proposition, John Sununu, then White
House Chief of Staff, was reported as stating in January 1991, that if Iraq attacked with
chemical weapons, the U.S. would not respond in kind.81
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"Excerpts from Bush's News Conference on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," New York
Times , 9 August 1990, A15.
75 Malcolm W. Browne, "As U. S. Force Builds, a Military Stalemate Shapes Up," New
York Times , 10 August 1990, All.
80
"Transcript of President's Address to U. N. General Assembly," New York Times
,
2 October 1990, A12.
81 Leslie H. Gelb, "Gas, Germs and Nukes," New York Times , 30 January 1991, A23.
28
Statements from the Department of Defense appeared also to lend credence to the
theory that chemical or nuclear response was not considered. At a Pentagon briefing in
January 1991, Major General Martin L. Brandtner stated, "To this point in time, we do not
intend to use chemical weapons. "" This echoed the opinion of a U.S. military officer
interviewed a month earlier: "If Saddam [Hussein] is smart, he won't go chemical or
biological, because we'll give it back to him in spades with our conventional weaponry."83
If the assumption, that President Bush did not intend to retaliate for a chemical
attack with weapons of mass destruction, is correct, the logical alternative would be the use
of conventional munitions. If a conventional response was planned, it would be essential to
both select an appropriate target set and communicate the deterrent threat to the adversary.
In regards to Iraq, potential targets could be characterized into categories of
population or military forces. The former refers to cities, transportation networks and other
areas where the purpose of an attack would be to kill civilians or lower the standard of living
of the population. The latter refers to the military and infrastructure targets, such as
electrical power plants or bridges, whose destruction would degrade military7 performance.14
From the outset of the Gulf crisis, President Bush indicated that the population of
Iraq would not be targeted. In September 1990, before a joint session of Congress, Bush
stated: "[T]he United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our quarrel is with Iraq's
dictator, and with his aggression." 3
!
A few days later, Bush reiterated this sentiment in an
82 Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Said to Authorize U. S. Use of Nonlethal Gas," New
York Times
,
26 January 1991, 17.
" Philip Shenon, "Troops Who'll Counter Gas Attack: Ready or Not?" New York
Times
,
13 December 1990, A20.
14 This distinction between target categories is not meant to imply that destroying
military forces does not result in civilian casualties. Targeting a nation's infrastructure would
produce collateral damage to the population.
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,
12 September 1990, A20.
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address to the people of Iraq: "We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq.. .our only object
is to oppose the invasion ordered by Saddam Hussein. ..I do not want to add to the suffering
of the people of Iraq." 86 In December 1990, Bush again made the point clear adding,
"We've only friendship for the people [in Iraq.]"' 7 These statements are evidence that
President Bush was not threatening Saddam Hussein with conventional, retaliatory attacks
on the Iraqi population. In fact, the emphasis on not targeting the Iraqi population forced
the Pentagon to justify attacks that resulted in reported civilian casualties. 88 Therefore the
only retaliatory option remaining would have been conventional attacks on Iraqi military
targets.
Before the commencement of the coalition air war against Iraqi forces, it was
possible to speculate on possible military target sets that the coalition would strike in
retaliation for Iraqi chemical attacks. Once the actual fighting began, however, it became
clear that the coalition was already striking the majority of potential military targets. 8 ' Given
this situation, it would not have been credible to threaten conventional retaliation for Iraqi
chemical attacks. The threat would not have made the situation any worse for the Iraqi
military.
The arguments presented thus far, cast doubt on the speculation that the retaliation
referred to bv President Bush and others, would have involved nuclear or chemical
86
"Text of Bush's Television Message to Iraqi People," New York Times , 17 September
1990, A10.
87
"Excerpts from President's News Conference on Crisis in Gulf," New York Times
,
1 December 1990, 16.
88 One example of this was the result of a 13 February 1991 U.S. strike on a bunker
in Baghdad. Coalition intelligence had determined that the bunker was being used as a
command and control facility. It was later discovered that the bunker had been sheltering
as many as 400 Iraqi civilians. Military briefers, after the incident, were forced to defend the
strike by providing evidence indicating the military significance of the bunker. Strate£ic
Survey 1990 - 1991 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), 69.
85 For a review of the military targets attacked during the air war, see Ibid., 68 - 71.
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munitions. Additionally, a U.S. threat of a conventional response would not have been
credible once the air war began. Yet, declarator}7 statements from Bush administration
officials indicated that a deterrent threat was being signalled to Saddam Hussein. It is
certainly not obvious that the Iraqi officials could have interpreted this threat from the
administration declarations previously cited."
3. Aggressor's Cost Benefit Analysis
The development of a deterrence policy requires that an assumption be made about
how an aggressor measures the costs and benefits of conflict. The object of deterrence is
to persuade the aggressor that, accounting for the threatened response of the defender, the
costs of an attack will be larger than any expected benefits. Bueno de Mesquita defines the
summation of costs and benefits as the "expected utility."51 The defender's goal is to
convince the aggressor that the expected utility is negative or that the attack will result in
a net cost.
In order to achieve this goal, the defender estimates how the aggressor calculates
expected utility. A simplistic view would argue that the costs are measured as the direct
results of battle. If this argument were valid, successful deterrence would merely require the
defender to convince the aggressor that it will lose militarily. John J. Mearsheimer argues
that "war is most likely to start when the potential attacker envisions a quick victory. When
the conflict promises to be more prolonged...deterrence is. ..likely to [be successful]. ..." s:
The implication of Mearsheimer's proposition is that the aggressor makes his decisions as
an opportunist, willing to attack if the military odds are in his favor.
,c An assumption of this argument which requires emphasis is that Hussein was able
to receive all of the Bush administration's declaratory signals cited. It may never be possible
to know what the Iraqi regime was "hearing" during the crisis.
11 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1981), 34.
52 Mearsheimer, 24.
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An evaluation of deterrence situations has indicated that this argument does not
always apply. Richard Ned Lebow examined thirteen international crises that he described
as cases of "brinkmanship." 53 Lebow theorizes that rationality would dictate that an
aggressor back down if a defender articulated a credible threat that was recognized to raise
excessively the costs of the attack.94 In eight of the cases, Lebow presents historical
evidence indicating that the defender did provide a credible commitment but deterrence
failed anyway. 95 Lebow proposes that there was more than opportunity that influenced the
aggressor's behavior: "We discovered a good opportunity for aggression (i.e., a vulnerable
commitment) in only about one-third of our cases but found strong needs to pursue an
aggressive foreign policy in every instance." 9 ' The needs Lebow refers to may force the
aggressor to take great risks to challenge the status quo, even against a stronger and more
capable defender. 57 In assessing the potential costs, the aggressor must compare them to
the cost of doing nothing at all. 58 Philip E. Tetlock proposes, "[Advocates of deterrence]
can argue that, dismal though the prospects for successful aggression were, those prospects
were still brighter than the prospects for a perpetuation of the status quo."59 Included in
9a Lebow denned brinkmanship as the situation "when a state knowingly challenges an
important commitment of another state in the hope of compelling its adversary to back away
from his commitment." Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981), 57. Notwithstanding the confusing reference to
compellence in his definition, Lebow is describing an immediate deterrence situation in which
the challenger is an aggressor threatening an attack.
' Ibid., 83.
5 Ibid., 93 - 97.
6 Ibid., 276.
7 Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution , 33 - 34.
8 Ibid.
9 Philip E. Tetlock, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Some Conceptual and Methodological
Issues," Journal of Social Issues 43 (No. 4 19S7): 87.
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the costs of the status quo are domestic instability and the political vulnerability of the
aggressor leadership.108
For successful deterrence, therefore, the defender must search beyond a military
assessment to appreciate the cost analysis of the aggressor. By recognizing what pressures,
both internal and external, are influencing the aggressor's decision-making, the defender will
be able to develop an effective threat.
4. Rationality
Underlying the assumption that the aggressor can be convinced that the costs of
an attack are too high is the premise that expected utility is determined in a rational manner.
The defender, in fact, is relying on an assumption of aggressor rationality while developing
a deterrence policy. Albert Wohlstetter and Richard Brody propose that:
[I]t is important to be able to deal with potentially irrational actions by
other governments, even suicidally irrational ones. ..Suicidal opponents
cannot be deterred from attacking the United States by threats to destroy
them if they do. Nor can the United States in any way prevent them
from moving to higher levels of nuclear violence. 1 ' 1
Therefore, the alternative of irrationality would imply the aggressor is non-deterrable.
Rationality, as referred to in deterrence literature, describes the process of decision-making
rather than the decisions themselves or consequences of implementing them.102 Rational
actors will make decisions which, in their perception will maximize their expected utility.101
100 Ibid., 34; and Lebow, Between Peace and War , 70 - 72.
101 Albert Wohlstetter and Richard Brody, "Continuing Control as a Requirement for
Deterring," in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zracket, ed., Managing
Nuclear Options (Washington, D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 144 - 145.
10
:
Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness (New York: Columbia University Press,
1989), 47.
101 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think,
Therefore I Deter," World Politics (January 1989): 208.
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Two types of rationality are often described in literature: perfect and objective.104 Perfect
rationality defines a process in which all necessary information and intelligence are available
and the decision-makers on both sides can unambiguously determine the costs and benefits
of any action. 10 ' While it does not assume that the defender and aggressor share the same
value system concerning their individual cost/benefit analysis, perfect rationality does imply
that each side recognizes and understands the other side's value priorities. Obviously, there
are impediments to the realization of perfect rationality in the actual decision-making
process. Foremost among these is the assumption that all sufficient information is available
to both sides.m Neither the defender nor the aggressor may know, with any assurance, what
the consequence of a decision will be. Similarly, the adversary's value system may not be
known and any actions taken, which are based on threatening the other's values, may be
ineffective. Another problem is that an actor's value system is not always internally
consistent. Therefore, it is difficult to translate values into courses of action.107
The critique of perfect rationality leads to the concept of objective rationality.
Fundamentally, objective rationality describes a process which recognizes all of the problems
and obstacles inherent in real-world decision-making and selects an action that will result
in the best possible outcome. 1 ce The decision-maker may not have complete information but
will make the best choice based on what is known. Objective rationality does not imply that
decision-makers must avoid risks. On the contrary, if the potential benefits of succeeding
104 Rhodes, 52 - 54, and Morgan, 7S - 79. Morgan adds a third concept of rationality
which he places between perfect and objective and which he simply terms rationality.
105 Rhodes, 52.
m George and Smoke, 75.
107 Ibid., 74 - 75.
108 Rhodes. 53.
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with a risky action outweigh its perceived costs, then risk-taking would be a logical option.109
It is this concept of risk which drove Richard Ned Lebow's analysis of cases of
brinkmanship. Lebow implies that aggressors driven by influences other than the military
balance and initiating attacks against the odds were irrational.110 To a rational aggressor, the
costs should have been high enough to deter attack.111
Aggressors may perceive that the resolution of internal pressures requires an attack
against a stronger and more capable defender. 112 This should not be considered irrational
behavior but must be accounted for when developing a deterrence strategy. 11 ' For the
purposes of this discussion, rationality is assumed to allow aggressors to evaluate their costs
by comparing internal and external pressures.
This concept of rationality has significant implications for deterrence policies
against authoritarian Third World regimes. Often the leaders of these regimes are termed
fanatical or mad. 111 As one example, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq has even been
109 Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," 208 -
209. Lebow and Stein differentiate between risk-prone and risk-adverse behavior but argue
that both can be described as rational. The difference is whether one attempts to maximize
gain or minimize loss.
110 Richard Ned Lebow, "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?," in Robert
Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, ed., Psychology and Deterrence
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 182 - 184.
111 For an argument defending this logic, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross
Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (No. 4 1987): 6-7.
112 Lebow recognizes these internal threats but proposes that their influence on an
aggressor's decision-making is an indication of irrationality. Lebow, Between Peace and
War
,
70 - 72.
us Lebow and Stein dismiss the possibility of basing deterrence on more than the
aggressor's external pressures. They argue that it is too difficult to identify the relevant
internal political and domestic variables that influence the aggressor's decision-making.
Robert Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence: Building Better Theory,"
Journal of Social Issues 43 (No. 4, 1987): 164.
m Les Aspin, A New Kind of Threat: Nuclear Weapons in an Uncertain Soviet Union .
12 September 1991, 1.
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described as a sociopath with no conscience. 115 The implication of these labels is that these
dictators do not adhere to accepted principles of international behavior and therefore, are
very difficult to deter. 11 '
There exists a paradox when considering rationality as it concerns nuclear
deterrence policy. Due to the destructiveness inherent in the weapons and the consequences
of a nuclear counterattack, it would seem to be an act of irrationality to consider their use.117
In fact it may be beneficial for a regime possessing nuclear weapons to appear irrational to
lend credibility to the threat of nuclear use. 118 Therefore, what has been described as an
underlying requirement for deterrence may not only be invalid but may also be
counterproductive to a deterrence policy.
A distinction must be made, however, between the rationality associated with a
regime's cost/benefit analysis and that associated with the decision-making process. In
order to credibly threaten an aggressor, a defender must recognize what the aggressor values.
It must be assumed that these values are arrived at in a rational manner. The resulting
policy of deterrence, however, should also account for the possibility that it will fail due to
an aggressor's irrational decision-making.
115 Adam Garfinkle, "Will Saddam Get the Bomb," National Review (13 May 1991):
37.
116 Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the
Threat? What Should be Done?" International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 28.
117 Jervis argues that many American nuclear strategists were flawed in their thinking
of nuclear weapons because they failed to recognize their unusability. He referred to this
as "conventionalization." Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 52.
118 Rhodes, 45.
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C. COERCIVE STRATEGIES FOR DETERRENCE AND COMPELLENCE
While the objectives and implementation of deterrence and compellence differ, both
policies can focus on the threatened use of military force to coerce an aggressor. Three
coercive strategies are available to a defender. The first of these, the strategy of retaliation,
is applicable to both deterrence and compellence situations. 119 The other two strategies,
denial and punishment, apply only to deterrence. 1 !C
1. Retaliation
The term retaliation is often equated to any use of military force in reaction to an
aggressive action. In that sense, retaliation merely describes the process of implementing
a threatened coercive strategy. The threat of retaliation, however, is a unique strategy onto
itself and it fundamentally differs from the strategies of denial and punishment.
As it relates to compellence, a threat of retaliation involves the use of military force
to change the status quo. The threatened response is initiated and applied until the
aggressor complies with the defender's demands. Retaliation can, however, also be utilized
as a strategy of deterrence. Edward Rhodes argues that a threat of retaliation can have
deterrent value if made to prevent an aggressor's action. In other words, a defender may
threaten that should an attack take place, a retaliatory response will be maintained until the
aggressor disengages from the attack. Rhodes proposes, "[i]n deterrence by
119 Rhodes refers to retaliation as a deterrence strategy. His description of retaliation,
however, also applies to situations of compellence. "The threat of retaliation is the threat
systematically to inflict an unrelated pain until the opponent ceases his noncompliance."
Rhodes, 94.
120 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment Research Monograph No.
1 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 195S), 3-7.
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retaliation...there is a blurring of the distinction between deterrence and compellence."121
The situation would become one of compellence, if the deterrent threat failed and the
aggressor attacked.
2. Denial
A strategy of denial may be based on one of two policies: defense or removal.
Each has significantly different approaches regarding implementation. Both policies share
the same objective which is to deter by threatening the denial of an aggressor's goals for an
attack.
Much of the literature discussing deterrence by denial emphasizes the defense
aspect. One argument states that a defender can deter aggression by providing for a defense
that would thwart any attempted attack. A simple manifestation of this would be a defense
aimed at repelling any forced territorial accession by an attacker. 121 In this sense, denial is
equated with defense, however, the similarity between these terms is misleading.
The objective of defense is to prevent harm from attack while the goal of a denial
strategy is to prevent an attacker from gaining benefits from an attack.'- :) The two objectives
only become synonymous if the goal of the attacker is harming the defender. This has not
always been the case. Even though the defensive capabilities of a defender may be
121 Rhodes, 95. It is not intuitive how a compellence strategy of retaliation could
succeed if the threat of the same retaliation failed to deter an aggressor. Rhodes offers
three possible reasons: (1) the aggressor may act irrationally either before or after
retaliation; (2) the aggressor may not have had accurate information on the damage the
retaliation would cause; and (3) the benefits for taking the aggressive act may decline with
time.
122 Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment
,
1.
122 Rhodes, 92.
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unambiguous, there is historical precedent for an aggressor conducting an attack knowing
there stood a slim chance of military victory } u
A practical problem with a deterrence policy of denial by defense is the lack of
appropriate defenses. In the past, the lack of a strategic missile defense has prevented
adoption of a defensive denial strategy against the Soviet Union. 1 :! Additionally, even if the
defenses exist, they may not be completely effective. Defensive capabilities are therefore
only one aspect of this type of denial strategy. The other aspect is preemption. Preemption
requires the defender to destroy the aggressor's military capability before the aggressor
attacks. The aggressor is thus prevented from attacking and denied the potential benefits
resulting from an attack. 1 "
The second policy applicable to a denial strategy is removal. This policy entails
destroying or removing the object of the aggressor's attack. An application of removal
would be a "scorched earth" policy. As the defender retreats from the territory desired by
the aggressor, the territory is destroyed to deny the aggressor any potential value from the
attack. As with a policy of defense, removal would only deter if it matched the objectives
of the aggressor.
3. Punishment
The final coercive strategy is that of punishment which does not account for the
aggressor's objectives like denial or attempt to force compliance like retaliation. As Robert
Jervis states, "Deterrence by punishment means convincing an adversary that is not sensible
lu Rhodes recounts the Egyptian decision to attack a superior Israeli army in 1973.
According to Rhodes, the Egyptian goal of the attack was not to defeat Israel, therefore an
Israeli strategy of defensive denial would not have been appropriate. Ibid., 92 - 93.
125 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution , 10.
lli Ibid. Jervis discussed preemption in terms of a U. S. strategic deterrence strategy
aimed at the former Soviet Union. The concepts of his argument are also valid for a general
discussion of deterrence.
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to attack because doing so will lead to unacceptable costs."127 Unlike the other coercive
strategies, punishment does not involve an interactive process between defender and
aggressor. 128 If deterrence fails, the aggressor's attack elicits a response and then deterrence
must be reestablished. This is in sharp contrast to retaliation which reverts to a compellence
situation of coercive bargaining if deterrence fails.129 Even a strategy of denial involves a
degree of interactive competition between forces attempting to seize or defend objectives.
Other differences between the coercive strategies can be noted. A strategy of
retaliation relies on a threat based on the ability to compel a reversal of aggressive action
and therefore is a more challenging strategy than the others. 1 n Deterrence based on a
strategy of denial may be the most recognizable to an aggressor but is relatively more
expensive to maintain than strategies of retaliation or punishment. 131
D. LESSONS OF MAD
The American experience at deterring the use of nuclear weapons has been shaped by
the Cold War conflict with the former Soviet Union. In 1964. Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense, introduced the term "assured destruction" to describe the capability
required for nuclear deterrence. 132 The essence of assured destruction was that successful
127 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1984), 75.
121 Rhodes, 97.
129 Ibid.
l" Schelling, 100. For an opposing view, see Peterson, 286 - 287.
131 Snyder argues that the elements of a punishment strategy may be required to ensure
security regardless of what strategy is implemented. Therefore providing for an adequate
denial capability would incur added costs to the defender. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and
Punishment , 7.
132 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1983), 246.
40
deterrence against a Soviet nuclear attack was achieved by the American capability to absorb
a nuclear first-strike and still maintain sufficient retaliatory forces to inflict unacceptable
punishment on the Soviet Union. 1 " By the late 1960's, it became evident to the U.S.
defense establishment that the Soviets also had acquired a second-strike capability. In his
1968 statement before Congress, McNamara stated:
The Soviets have, in fact, acquired a large force of ICBM's [Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles] installed in hardened underground silos. To put it bluntly,
neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can attack the other, even by
complete surprise, without suffering massive damage in retaliation. This is so
because each side has achieved, and will most likely maintain over the foreseeable
future, an actual and credible second strike capability against the other. 134
The situation described by McNamara has been termed mutual assured destruction
(MAD). 135 It is not the goal of this discussion to debate the logic or criticisms of nuclear
strategies based on MAD. Rather it is helpful to demonstrate how the strategies for
deterrence are applied to the situation of MAD in U.S. policy.13 '
Of the coercive strategies available to the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, it
can be argued that all three, punishment, retaliation, and denial have been applied. The
strategy of punishment was first articulated in 1954 by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
1,3 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the
Defense Program, 1961 - 1969 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971), 174.
m Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program
and 1969 Defense Budget (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968): 174.
1,1 It may be more descriptive to use the term mutual assured vulnerability. See Colin
S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 271 -
276.
'
1,1 MAD is sometimes referred to as an American strategy or doctrine. It is neither.
MAD describes the perceived situation based merely on the capability of the opposing
nuclear arsenals and the rejection of defenses that would affect vulnerability to attack. One
significant criticism of MAD is that the Soviets never accepted this American perception.
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in the Eisenhower administration. 1 s? It became known as the doctrine of "Massive
Retaliation" although it described a simple punitive, rather than retaliatory strategy. It did
not seek to either deny the Soviets their war objectives or to threaten the application of
compellent force as would respective strategies of denial and retaliation. 118
Edward Rhodes proposes that, in the 1960's U.S. strategy accommodated "the new-
reality of mutual societal vulnerability...by attempting to abandon nuclear punishment not in
favor of nuclear denial but in favor of nuclear retaliation. "ias Rhodes argues that the
Kennedy administration's strategy of "Flexible Response" was a threat to escalate gradually
the use of nuclear weapons to increase the overall costs to the Soviets in order to enforce
compliance for conflict termination.140 Others refer to a U.S. deterrent policy after the
recognition of MAD as denial. 141 Jervis proposes that the policy actually relied on the
notion of punishment. "[T]he mutual vulnerability created by nuclear weapons has brought
about a revolution in statecraft. The superpowers can no longer deter by denial. Instead
they must deter by punishment." 142 The confusion over which strategy was applied rests in
the failure for a single coercive strategy to address all of the attack options that were
available to the Soviet Union.
1,7 Earlier, during the Truman administration, .American policy towards the use of atomic
weapons was unclear, although the military did plan for their availability to use in a war
against the Soviet Union. See David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear
Weapons and American Strategy, 1945 - 1960," International Security 7 (Spring 19S3): 12 -
14.
1JS Rhodes, 99.
1,9 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment
,
5. Denial is appropriate if it
succeeds in thwarting the Soviets from achieving their goals by threatening destruction of
their economic, military, and political power after an attack.
142 Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 114.
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A nuclear strategy of punishment appears credible as a threat to deter a nuclear attack
on the United States.HS It loses credibility, however, when applied to a case of extended
deterrence. To threaten punishment to prevent nuclear attack on a third party in a situation
of MAD, a defender must accept destruction of its own country. 1 " Punishment appears
even less logical as a threatened strategy when used to deter a conventional attack on a third
party.
Focusing on deterring the Soviet use of nuclear weapons, a strategy of punishment is
credible in situations of central deterrence and the strategies of denial and retaliation are
credible in cases of extended deterrence. Of the latter two, denial appears to have been a
more logical choice if the deterrent goal is the prevention of nuclear use. This is because
retaliation becomes a compellent threat once deterrence fails and attempts to prevent nuclear
escalation rather than initial use of nuclear weapons.
The lessons of MAD and the American experience are only useful in this discussion
as they relate to a potential deterrence situation in the Third World. It is therefore
important to recognize the differences between a deterrence policy once aimed at the Soviet
Union and one aimed at a nation in the developing world.
The most obvious difference is that the situation of MAD does not exist. Estimates of
the potential size of Third World nuclear arsenals, indicate that in the foreseeable future,
they will neither be large enough nor have the capabilities to maintain a survivable second-
141 Paul Nitze argues that punishment is not an adequate central deterrence threat. He
proposes a scenario of a Soviet first-strike against U.S. nuclear forces in which an American
President would feel restrained from retaliating by the knowledge that Soviets would respond
by an attack on U. S. cities. Paul Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," Foreign Policy
25(Winter 1976 - 77): 195 - 210.
lu Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D. C: The
Brookings Institution, 1987), 10 -11.
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strike capability. 1 ' ! The credibility problems associated with extended deterrence under
MAD, therefore, disappear. The absence of a second-strike capability does not imply that
central deterrence is not an issue for the United States vis-a vis the Third World. The
proliferation of missile and other delivery system technology indicates a future potential
capability for Third World attacks on the United States. 14 '
If the need for central deterrence against Third World nuclear powers appears remote,
the need for a U.S. extended deterrence policy is imminent. Even the crudest of nuclear
delivery systems can threaten U.S. allies or forces abroad. Therefore, it is critical that the
United States address the extended deterrence problem with an appropriate coercive strategy.
E. COERCIVE STRATEGY FOR THE THIRD WORLD
In order to decide which coercive strategy is appropriate for the Third World, it is
important to focus again on the desired goal of deterrence. This discussion is centered on
the need to develop a deterrence policy to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by Third
World authoritarian regimes. It is not a prescription for threatening a response against any
attack option available to a potential Third World dictator. Therefore, the deterrence policy
developed should be applicable in either pre-war or intra-war situations.
Since the goal is preventing nuclear use, a strategy of retaliation is rejected. It would
not be productive to threaten that once the nuclear threshold is crossed, the United States
will respond until the aggressor ceases the use of nuclear weapons. Again, the size of the
115 Spector and Smith propose that of all the potential Third World nuclear powers,
Israel's arsenal is the largest at an estimate of between 50 and 200 devices. Spector with
Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 , 159. This number
is 10 times smaller than the most conservative proposal for U.S. warhead reductions. Andrew
Rosenthal, "Bush and Yeltsin Propose Deep Cuts in Atomic Weapons," New York Times,
30 January 1992, Al and A6.
1,6 Fetter, 6. For an analysis of the potential of Third World ballistic missile
capabilities, see Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World
(Washington, D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1991), especially Chapter Three.
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Third World arsenals will restrict the number of nuclear attacks made by the aggressor. This
could result in retaliation succeeding only after a significant portion of the aggressor's
nuclear inventory is depleted.
Since it is difficult to ascertain whether the authoritarian Third World regimes in
question can be relied upon to behave rationally, a strategy of denial must be developed in
the event deterrence fails. Specifically, a defensive denial strategy is needed. The capability
for intercepting and destroying nuclear delivery systems will effectively deny the aggressive
regime any benefit for their use. Even if technical solutions are found for the defense
challenge, however, it is improbable that such answers will guarantee complete
effectiveness. 147 Therefore, the limitations of defense capabilities necessitate the integration
of the preemptive aspects of a denial strategy. This would alleviate the burden on defenses
to satisfy the requirements of a denial strategy.148 The targeting goals of the denial strategy
are easily recognizable. Preemption will require the United States to target and destroy the
nuclear delivery systems before the potential aggressor has the opportunity to employ them.
While a strategy of denial addresses deterrence failure, a punishment strategy would
be an appropriate basis for a deterrence policy. Third World nuclear powers must be
threatened with attacks that will excessively raise the costs of nuclear use. The absence of
a situation of MAD allows this strategy to be credible. This threat, however must also be
perceived as credible both before a crisis and as an intra-war deterrence policy. One of the
critical lessons of the Gulf War is that once the coalition air attacks began, the Bush
147 An extensive discussion of American defensive capabilities will be presented in
chapter IV.
14! Interestingly, The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization argues that ballistic
missile defenses eliminate the need for preemption "Defenses also reduce the incentives
for anticipatory or preemptive attacks by allied, coalition, or other national forces against
those countries threatening attack with ballistic missiles." Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization, 1991 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative , May 1991,
1-6.
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administration was severely limited to the types of targets that either could be credibly
threatened or that would be recognized by the Iraqi regime as significantly different.
The targeting requirements of the punishment strategy, therefore, are not readily
apparent. To fulfill the requirements of deterrence, the threat must target the value system
of the aggressor and be within U.S. capabilities. Additionally, because of the potential need
to implement this type of deterrence during an on-going conflict, the threat must be
effectively signalled so that it is recognized by the aggressor as significantly more devastating
than the scope of the present fighting. It is the criteria for the development of this deterrent
threat that forms the basis of the next chapter.
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III. OMNIBALANCING AND THIRD WORLD DETERRENCE
The discussion of nuclear deterrence emphasized three coercive strategies available to
the United States: retaliation, denial and punishment. Of these, denial and punishment
were evaluated as applicable to a Third World nuclear deterrence policy. The focus of this
chapter is the development of a punishment strategy aimed at Third World authoritarian
regimes. This discussion identifies a common value system among Third World dictators and
translates this into a target set that could be threatened, in a crisis, for successful deterrence.
It will be argued that the theory of omnibalancing predicts that authoritarian regimes are
influenced by perceived threats to their internal security. An analysis of how these regimes
maintain their base of power will be offered. Finally, a general target set will be developed
based on holding at risk the mechanisms Third World dictatorships utilize to maintain
internal control.
A INTERNAL THREATS AND OMNIBALANCING
Third World authoritarian regimes are characterized by a heterogeneous population,
narrow support base and domestic challenges to regime legitimacy. These features influence
the threat assessment calculations of Third World dictators. In many cases, the lack of
consensus in domestic support results in the internal dimension of security becoming the
most significant to the regime in power. 1 According to Mark Gasiorowski, "In much of the
Third World today, domestic political instability poses a much greater threat to vital national
1 Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States (Dover, MA Auburn
House Publishing Company, 1987), 5.
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values than threats originating abroad."2 The effect of this perception of internal threats
on decision-making of Third World authoritarian regimes has been discussed in literature
with respect to alliance formation. Steven R. David introduces the term, "omni-balancing"
to describe the behavior of Third World leaders.' The term omnibalancing implies that a
compromise is sought between addressing external and internal threats. David does not
argue that Third World leaders will only react to internal threats to their regimes. He does
propose, however, that threat prioritization will be dependent on "the drive of Third World
leaders to ensure their political and physical survival." 4
The consideration of internal threats distinguishes the theory of omnibalancing from
previous theories explaining Third World alignment decisions. Stephen M. Walt proposes
that when faced with an external threat, Third World leaders respond in one of two ways.5
The first is termed "balancing" and describes the formation of an alliance in order to check
a potential adversary and prevent it from becoming a dominant power in the region.' The
second response is "bandwagoning" which refers to the act of allying with a stronger power
when it threatens the security of the Third World regime. 7 In discussing both balancing
1 Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Regime Legitimacy and National Security: The Case of Pahlavi
Iran," in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon ed., National Security in the Third World
(Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988), 228.
3 Steven R. David, Choosing Sides (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991),
7.
< David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," 236.
5 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987),
28 - 29.
1 Ibid., 18.
7 Ibid., 19.
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and bandwagoning, Walt focuses on the external aspects of regime security.8 David does
not entirely dismiss Walt's theories of alignment behavior but believes their omission of the
internal dimension of security renders them inadequate. 9
The prioritization between internal and external threats may result in behavior that
may not appear to be in the national interest of the Third World state. The theory of
omnibalancing, however, allows even for the case of a Third World dictator who acts to
protect his regime at the expense of the population. David proposes, "[W]hen confronted
with a decision between aligning so as to benefit the state but endangering their hold on
power and aligning in such a way that would harm the state but would preserve their power,
the [Third World] leadership will choose the latter."10 This behavior is understandable since
the authoritarian leadership neither recognizes its country as a "nation," nor is driven by
national aspirations.
The preoccupation with internal threats characterized by omnibalancing is historically
justifiable. Between 1945 - 1985, there have been 183 successful coups d'etat and 174
unsuccessful coup attempts in the Third World. 11 Between 1958 and 1981, there were 41
successful coups in 22 countries of Black .Africa alone. 12 In Latin America, every nation
8 Walt's discussion of "balancing" and "bandwagoning" draws upon arguments from
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing
Company, 1979). For a critical analysis of Waltz's theories, see Thomas J. Christensen and
Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in
Multipolarity," International Organization 44 (Spring 1990): 137 - 168.
' David, Choosing Sides , 16.
10 Ibid., 7.
11 Steven R. David, Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 1.
11 Jackson and Rosberg, 8.
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except Mexico has experienced at least one coup since World War II." In fact, according
to David, the coups d'etat is the "most common form of coercive regime change"1 * in the
Third World.
While the internal security perceptions of Third World leaders may not have received
adequate attention in literature, it is not a new phenomenon. 1
!
In the early 1960's, for
example, the military assistance from the United States to Latin America was primarily
concerned with the military aspects of counter-insurgency. 16 In sub-Saharan Africa, ten
nations have suffered severe domestic disorder or civil war from the mid-1950's to the early
1980's. 1T
Adding to the significance of internal security for Third World authoritarian regimes
is the rarity of the loss of sovereignty to external forces. Even considering the recent
attempt by Iraq to annex Kuwait, the weakest of the Third World nations have managed to
maintain their legal status of nationhood. 15 National survival, therefore, is rarely threatened
13 John Samuel Fitch, The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 3.
14 David, Choosing Sides
.
12.
15 For a review of the literature emphasis on external threats to the Third World and
the recent shift in focus, see Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third
World," World Pontics 43 (January 1991): 257 - 283.
" Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role
Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins Policies and Future (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 50.
11 The nations are: Sudan (1956 - 1972); Rwanda (1959 - 1964); Zaire (1960 - 1965;
1977 - 1978); Ethiopia (1962 - 1982); Zanzibar (1964); Burundi (1966 - 1972); Chad (1966 -
1982); Uganda (1966; 1978 - 1982); Nigeria (1967 - 1970); and Angola (1975 - 1982).
Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," 5.
18 Jackson and Rosberg define the legal criteria for nationhood as the possession of
defined territory and the international recognition of independence. Ibid, 13.
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but the stability of the regime in power is frequently at risk." The stability of Third World
sovereignty is attributed to the influence and support of the international community as
represented by organizations like the United Nations. 20 This international support lends
legitimacy, not to the regime, but to the territorial integrity of the state.21
The argument that external threats are less frequent than internal threats to regime
security does not imply that international conflict does not occur in the Third World. A
review of the outbreak of wars in the Third World since 1945 clearly demonstrates the
prevalency of conflict due to external forces. 22 Omnibalancing theory does predict, however,
that faced with both internal and external threats, Third World leaders will act to protect
their regime.
For this discussion, omnibalancing behavior is assumed to be the significant influence
on Third World decision-making. A logical extension of this explanation of how
authoritarian regimes align themselves in the face of threats is a formula for successfully
threatening Third World states. Omnibalancing may be the key in determining how to deter
Third World authoritarian regimes.
Deterrence in the Third World will require threatening the regime's base of power.
Specifically, the deterring power must hold at risk the mechanisms Third World dictators
utilize to maintain internal control. The question that requires answering is whether or not
l
* Michael N. Bamett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments:
The Case of Egypt, 1962 - 73," International Organizations 45 Jummer 1991): 373.
20 Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist. ' 16 - 21.
21 Ibid., 20.
22 Azar and Moon report that between 1945 and 198S, 90% of all conflict and
international violence and 1 19 out of 120 recorded wars have taken place in the Third World.
Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, "Rethinking Third World National Security," in
Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon ed., National Security in the Third World (Aldershot,
England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988), 3.
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it is possible to influence favorably the decision-making of the regime leadership, by
threatening the internal stability of a Third World state.
1. Extemalization of Internal Threats and Scapegoat Wars
Before discussing the mechanisms Third World authoritarian leaders use for internal
control, two behavioral obstacles to successful deterrence need to be discussed. They are
the extemalization of internal threats and the tendency toward "scapegoat wars." These
obstacles are similar in that they describe methods by which Third World authoritarian
regimes use foreign policy to strengthen their domestic position. 1 Both represent responses
to threats to the internal security of the regime. WTiile there is historical precedence for
these responses in the face of actual external enemies, it has also been possible for the
regime to conjure up threats for use in dissipating internal opposition.14 Understanding the
way Third World dictators respond to perceived internal threats is thus critical to the
development of a nuclear deterrence policy based on omnibalancing.
The authoritarian leadership, in an attempt to thwart internal opposition, may focus
the blame for the state's domestic ills on a recognizable external foe. For the purposes of
this discussion, this is referred to as externalizing the internal threat. The generational
memory of the former colonial populace is especially susceptible to a dictator's accusations
against former imperial powers. The regime leadership can also achieve its aims by focusing
blame on a regional rival, particularly if there is a history of conflict between the regime and
the rival state.
The Ba'athist regime in Iraq is one example of the latter case. Specifically, the
decision of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to invade Iran in September 19S0 suggests that
Hussein was concerned about the internal opposition to his regime. While the Shah of Iran
21 W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969), 228 - 236.
u Ibid., 230.
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held power he did not directly threaten the stability of the Ba'athist regime.25 With the fall
of the Shah in June 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini became a significant threat. The
Ayatollah was committed to having the Iraqi Ba'ath Party overthrown and replaced with a
Shi'ite Islamic government of the same ideology as himself.1 i While initially the Shi'ite
population in Iraq was unresponsive to Khomeini's call for rebellion, the Ba'ath regime
quickly took action to strengthen its control including ordering purges of Shi'ite
fundamentalists.27
On July 17, 1979, Saddam Hussein became President of Iraq and Chairman of the
Ba'ath Party. 28 He expanded the purges to include the Ba'ath membership and within one
month, over 100 arrests were made. 25 According to Ralph King, it was the extemalization
of Hussein's perception of the internal threat that led him to the decision of war with Iran.
"The Iraqi argument for war might have been put this way: If no positive step were taken
soon to meet the political challenge head on, the Ba'ath authority - and by extension, the
state - might collapse." 30 Reacting to the external threat of Khomeini, Hussein quickly
acted to consolidate his internal power base.
25 Mohammed Ayoob, "Perspectives from the Gulf: Regime Security or Regional
Security," in Donald Hugh McMillen, ed., Asian Perspectives on International Security .
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 19S4), 102. In fact, Ayoob proposed that the Shah actually
increased Ba'athist consolidation of power by "playing the role of credible whipping boy" on
which the domestic ills of Iraq could be blamed.
26 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War
Volume II: The Iran - Iraq War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 22.
27 This was not a new tactic. In 1978, Iraq had launched a crackdown among Kurds
and Iraqi Communists, resulting in executions in May 1978. Ibid., 25.
21 Ibid., 27.
29 Ibid., 28.
20 Ralph King, The Iran - Iraq War: The Political Implications
, Adelphi Paper No. 219
(London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 19S7), 10.
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The Iraqi case indicates potential limitations of using the theory7 of omnibalancing
for a deterrence policy. Hussein's response indicates that Khomeini was threatening the
Ba'ath regime's internal control. The result was an escalation of conflict rather than any
type of deterrence. 11
There are some unique circumstances however, that certainly influenced Hussein's
decision.' 2 At the very least, Hussein calculated that he could defeat Iran and the threat
Khomeini posed. An obvious lesson is that threatening internal control may not deter if
Third World elites believe it can be circumvented. 1 '
Another example of externalizing an internal threat is Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat's decision to invade Israel in October 1973. The influence of the internal threat to
Sadat's regime can be 'raced back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. As a result of that war,
Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula and faced Egypt across the Suez Canal."
Sadat had been named Vice-President under Gamal Abdel Nasser in December
1969. When Nasser died in September 1970, Sadat ascended to the Presidency. 55 When
Sadat took office, it appeared that the external threat of Israel was the most significant
31 Hussein's behavior does not conflict with omnibalancing. According to David's
logic. Hussein perceived Khomeini as the greatest threat to his internal control and acted
accordingly.
32 The timing of the Iraqi invasion was critical. Post-revolutionary Iran was perceived
to be weak. The Iranian military had been purged of their leadership and had lost Western
military assistance. Also, the perceived defection of Egypt from the Arab camp with the
signing of the peace treaty with Israel created a leadership vacuum which Hussein was eager
to fill. Ayoob, "Perspectives From the Gulf: Regime Security or Regional Security," 104.
" This point regarding deterrence failure serves as a critique of conventional deterrence
literature. Mearsheimer proposes that conventional deterrence is not a function of either the
balance of forces or the available weapons. Rather, it is a function of the military strategy
utilized by both sides. In the Iraqi case, Hussein perceived that his strategy would overcome
the internal threat posed by Khomeini and thus was not deterred. Mearsheimer, 28.
14 David, Choosing Sides
,
58.
15 Ibid.
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source for instability in his regime. Walt argues that Sadat was primarily reacting to this
external threat when he made the decision for war."
David, however, counters Walt's argument. He describes Sadat's initial threat
concern as predominantly internal to the regime. According to David's proposition, Sadat
realized that "his tenure in office depended on the support of the military."37 As long as
Israeli forces occupied the Sinai, the Egyptian military would grow increasingly frustrated and
resentful of the Egyptian regime in power. No goal was more portentous to the Egyptian
military leadership than regaining their honor by ousting Israeli forces from their lost
territory. 38 In fact, as David recounts, the threat of an Israeli attack on Egypt became
remote by 1970. 3 ' By that time, only the Egyptian military had the power to remove Sadat's
regime from power. Placating the military, therefore, was Sadat's most important priority. 4 ''
As David proposes, by 1973 Sadat had exhausted diplomatic and political solutions to
remove the Israelis from the Sinai:
The Egyptian military had become dangerously restive after years of
inactively and humiliation on the banks of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian
people too had run out of patience with the continuing stalemate.
Stopgap measures and excuses could no longer justify the failure to take
action against the Israelis.41
36 Walt traced the 1973 war to three developments: "(1) The failure to reach a political
solution to the Arab-Israeli Dispute, (2) The ability of key Middle East states. ..to obtain
increased military support from their superpower patrons, and (3) The formation of the first
effective anti-Israeli alliance by the Arab states." Walt, 114.
37 David, Choosing Sides , 59.
" Ibid.
39 Ibid., 68. David argues that omnibalancing not only explains Sadat's decision for
war, but also makes Egypt's alignment decisions with the Soviet Union understandable.
40 Ibid., 69.
41 Ibid., 84.
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As with the Iraqi example, omnibalancing explains why Sadat externalized the internal threat
to his regime.
The extemalization of internal threats does not always result in military hostilities.
For example, during over two decades of rule, President Hafez Al-Assad of Syria has
deflected internal opposition to his regime by passing blame for Syria's domestic troubles
onto such external powers as Israel, Iraq and the United States/ 2 Interestingly, this same
technique for diffusing internal opposition has also been attributed to the Soviet Union.
George F. Kennan, in his famous "X" article, argues that, starting in the 1920's, "all internal
opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces
of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power." 41
The second obstacle to utilizing omnibalancing to formulate deterrence strategy is
the notion of the "scapegoat" or diversionary war. According to the concept of diversionary
war, a regime facing internal instability may choose to initiate external conflict to unite
domestic consensus against a common foe/* A scapegoat war can be utilized by the regime
to justify reductions of local autonomy and political freedom. 41 It can also assist in both
preventing internal fragmentation and countering domestic insurrection.46 As in the case
of a regime externalizing its internal threat, a regime prone to scapegoat wars might respond
42 Margaret G. Hermann, "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad," in Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey
Z. Rubin ed., Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1988), 76.
42 X [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July
1947): 570.
44 For a concise review of the theoretical arguments concerning the validity of scapegoat
wars, see Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus I.
Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman Inc., 1989), 259 - 288.
45 Wriggins, 230.
4t Amo J. Mayer, " Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870 - 1956: A
Research Assignment," World Politics 41 (September 1969): 295.
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to a deterrent threat on its mechanisms of control by attacking the deterring power. The
argument supporting scapegoat wars would predict that deterrence based on omnibalancing
may have difficulty succeeding.
One case that is often explained in terms of the notion of a scapegoat war is the
1983 Falkland Islands War between Great Britain and Argentina. The debate over ownership
of the Falkland Islands has a interminable history. The impetus for Argentine occupation
of the islands in April 1982, however, was more than the insistence of legal entitlements.17
In March 1976, control of the Argentine government had been taken over, in a
bloodless coup, by a military Junta. 18 The Junta had promised an end to inflation, an
increase to productivity and wages, and the elimination of leftist terrorist groups. 15 By 1982.
it had become clear that the Junta was failing to keep these promises. Economically,
attempts in the late 1970's to restructure the production base and enter the world market
resulted in nearly bankrupting entire industrial sectors.50 By 19S1, economic growth was
below 1.0 percent and twenty-eight major banks had collapsed. Inflation was 149 percent
and real wages had declined by 18 percent. Out of a population of twenty- eight million,
47 Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano, Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of
Military7 Rule (London: Verso Editions, 1984), 63.
18 Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculations in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the
Falkland War," The Journal of Strategic Studies 6 (March 1983): 11.
49 Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198S), 144.
5C Dabat and Lorenzano, 64. The hardest hit were the textile industries, agricultural
consumer-goods, branches of the metal industry and regional employers of labor such as
vineyards and fruit farms.
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there may have been as many as two million unemployed.' 1 Additionally, the Junta had
increased Argentina's foreign debt faster than had any previous regime.52
In addition to the economic turmoil, the Argentine people had suffered from
^discriminate attacks on Leftist groups and their alleged sympathizers. Some estimates
report as many as 20,000 people were killed." In 19S1, the influential Catholic Church
began to publicly protest the excesses of the government. Strikes were being threatened by
the major unions and mass protest movements began to be organized." The Argentine
press began to criticize openly the Junta's economic performance and failure for settling the
Falkland dispute."
It was in this context that the Junta of General Lopoldo Galtieri considered
military action in the Falklands. He sought to unite the principal opposition groups by
selling the Falklands campaign as a patriotic defense against imperialist England." He also
sought to transform the image of the military and their role in Argentina's government.
According to Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano:
From being the army of the 'dirty war,' [the Argentine military] would
turn into patriots bent on recovering for the nation a portion of territory
under imperial occupation. And having risked their lives in defence (sic)
of the nation, they would become the dispensers of reward and
punishment. All dissent would constitute an outrage against the architects
and guarantors of national integrity. ..No one would feel able to. ..question
the course [the junta] charted in the economy, policy and society."
12.
1 Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War,"
: Gustafson, 145.
3 Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War," 11.
4 Dabat and Lorenzano, 72 - 75.
5 Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War," 12.
' Dabat and Lorenzano, 76.
; Ibid.
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In this view, a victory in the Falklands would have vindicated the military government in the
eyes of the Argentine people.
The Falkland War example aside, there is some doubt that the scapegoat war
phenomenon is valid. 58 Geoffrey Blainey analyzed warfare between 1815 and 1939. He
concludes that the historical record does not support the notion of scapegoat wars."
Blainey argues that nations suffering from severe internal unrest tended to avoid wars
because of the lack of domestic support for providing the resources required to fight." The
ability of a regime to extract the required war resources from its society is dependent on the
strength of domestic opposition to the regime and on the internal perception of the external
threat.51 According to Blainey's argument, a deterrent threat based on omnibalancing would
not lead to a scapegoat war if the regime perceived its internal control at risk. 62
Notwithstanding Blainey's findings, some analysts still consider the scapegoat war a real
phenomenon."
The cases of externalizing an internal threat and the scapegoat war both indicate
potential limitations of using omnibalancing to formulate a Third World nuclear deterrence
policy. Both cases describe regimes who reacted to the internal threats to their security by
58 For a contrasting view of the Junta's reasons for invading the Falklands see
Gustafson. 146 - 152; and Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign
Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984), 261 - 272.
55 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 72 - 86.
50 Ibid., 86.
61 Alan C. Lambom, "Power and the Politics of Extraction," International Studies
Quarterly 27 (June 19S3): 130.
62 Mayer, studying European warfare from 1870 - 1956, comes to a similar conclusion.
"[GJovernments that face acute internal turmoil or conflict are inclined to avoid a test of
arms in which the risks of defeat, and hence of fatal inner convulsions, seem prohibitively
high." Mayer, 295.
83 Levy, 259 - 288.
59
striking external powers. While this result is opposite of the one desired in a deterrence
situation, it does not invalidate a ctrategy based on omnibalancing. According to
omnibalancing, a Third World regime will react to what it perceives as the greatest threat to
its power. In the cases of Iraq, Egypt, and Argentina, the regimes perceived that the
potential external conflict was less threatening than the potential of a coup. In order to
deter these regimes, the external power must pose a credible and overwhelming threat to
mechanisms of internal control and convince the regime that if deterrence fails, the regime
will be overthrown.
B. MECHANISMS OF INTERNAL CONTROL
To implement a deterrence policy based on the theory of omnibalancing, the internal
control mechanisms of a Third World authoritarian regime must be threatened. Two sources
of literature can explain how these regimes maintain their stability. The first is the literature
which analyzes the likelihood and results of coups d'etat. The second is the literature
dedicated to the study of Third World economic development. Using this evidence, it is
possible to formulate a list of general types of targets to hold at risk for deterrence. Before
developing these theoretical target sets, it is first important to distinguish between the core
following and the periphery following of a regime.
1. Clientelism and Regime Legitimacy
Many authoritarian regimes are "personal" governments that are dependent on the
support of the state elites. 64 One mechanism by which these regimes maintain stability is
termed clientelism. Jackson and Rosberg define clientelism as "a system of patron-client
ties that bind leaders and followers in relationships not only of mutual assistance and
H Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa , 23.
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support, but also of recognized and accepted inequality between big men and lesser men.""
The leadership of the regime, in the role of patron, elicits support and allegiance from the
military, the regime membership and other sources of power in the state. These ties of
loyalty can be broken down into two different levels: affective and instrumental.16
Affective ties are based on more than professional or economic relationships. They
develop from personal links between the patron and clients. 67 The ruler may have come
from the same town or village as the clients or have been a classmate of the clients in
school. The relationships that form affective ties range from that based on the ruler and
regime elite being family members to that resulting from shared ideological convictions.
For this analysis, it is not necessarily important to distinguish the source of the
affective ties. It is more important to note that these ties represent the core following of
the regime leadership. 68 The size of this core is an indication of the stability of the regime
because it contains the "virtually irreducible"' 5 base of support. The loyalty of the core
following is strong enough to make it impervious to external threats to the regime.
Instrumental ties are based on the perceived supply of benefits that clients receive
from the dictator. These ties form between the authoritarian leadership and the periphery
following and are dependent on the resource base of the regime: Since the instrumental
ties are based on material reward, they are subject to the fluctuations of the regime's
65 Ibid., 39.
66 James C. Scott, "Patron - Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,"
The American Political Science Review 66 (March 1972): 99.
t: Ibid.
(l Ibid.
ts Ibid.
70 Ibid.
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economic growth. The periphery following could turn against the dictatorship, if it perceived
a declining resource base.71
The size of the periphery following is an indication of the perceived legitimacy of
the regime." As Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat states, "[T]he degree of satisfaction of
[societal] wants and needs determines. ..aggressive drives in the society...." 7 ' To say that a
particular regime ignores the domestic needs of its society (and therefore has a low
periphery following), however, is not to say the regime is unstable. According to Al-Mashat,
"The generalized loyalty of a wider public to a personal ruler is probably less important than
the more immediate and direct loyalty of lieutenants and [core] clients."74 Nevertheless, it
is the mechanisms the authoritarian regime uses to control the periphery following that are
the focus of this section.
There is abundant literature on the causes of coups d'etat in the Third World.
There are disagreements, however, on the motivating influences that spark a coup d'etat. 7 '
For this discussion, the conditions that lead to successful coups are more significant than
the motivations that lead to coup attempts. Two causal themes that reoccur in the coup
literature are the dissatisfaction of the general military forces and the deterioration of the
national economy. The general military forces may become dissatisfied with their lack of
military autonomy under the often oppressive control of elite security forces. The economy
71 The term "resources" in this discussion does not only refer to financial or investment
wealth. Status is also a resource dependent on the regime leadership and can affect the
perceptions of the regime's military or security forces.
72 Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder:
Westview Press, 19S5), 43 - 44.
73 Ibid., 44.
74 Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa , 41.
75 For an excellent empirical analysis of common theories of the causes of coups, see
William R. Thompson, "Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup," Comparative Politics
7 (July 1975): 459 - 487.
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of the authoritarian state determines the strength of the instrumental ties between the
periphery following and the dictator.
The periphery following represents the challenge to the Third World dictator in
maintaining internal control. An organized dissatisfaction of the periphery could result in
a coup d'etat. Third World regimes have two instruments to control the periphery following,
suppression and distribution of resources.
2. Internal Control Through Suppression
Suppression refers to the utilization of force to ensure that the potential opposition
is unable to threaten the regime. The most common means of suppression are internal
security forces. In many regimes, these forces are made up of an elite military membership
separate from the general purpose forces. The regime leadership depends on these forces
as part of the core following.
In Libya, the revolutionary guards play this role for Khadaffi's regime. The
majority of them have been recruited from Khadaffi's own tribe to ensure their loyalty.
They have been placed in positions of control and authority throughout the Libyan military
forces and, though relatively small in numbers, are lavishly provided with combat equipment
and other rewards.76
In Hussein's Iraq, the Republican Guard is the elite military force. Originally, the
Guard was organized as a security force rather than as a combat formation." In contrast
to Libyan elite forces, the Guard do not hold positions of authority within the regular
military. From the late 1970's, according to Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, the
Republican Guard has been "recruited... and charged with a specific mission to protect the
" An example of the control the revolutionary guards hold over the Libyan military are
the reports of guard members holding the keys to ammunition stockpiles at the major
military bases and thus controlling weapon distribution. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Libya: A
Country Study
,
(Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 19S9), 257.
77 Cordesman and Wagner, 61.
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core of the regime. In the process of fitting them for this task, it was noticeable that they
were being trained and armed not to deal with civil disturbance but with military revolt."78
Hussein's perception of internal threats, therefore, is focused on the regular military forces.
Both the Libyan and Iraqi regimes tightly control the recruitment of elites,
especially in the case of internal security forces. Mohammed Ayoob defines the recruitment
system as "'closed' since one has to belong to the right parentage or town/area to obtain
membership."75 Recruitment can make the regime vulnerable to a threat that targets the
elite military forces. The general purposes forces do not share the elite's support of the
regime and the regime leadership may feel anxious about the prospect of the military
becoming unshackled from elite control.
By contrast to Iraq and Libya, the Iranian recruitment system is very open. As
Ayoob states, the only restrictions for acceptance to the Iranian elite system are "ideological
commitment and shared political values. "" In 19S4, one Iranian revolutionary7 leader
described the composition of the elite Iranian revolutionary guards as, "10 percent city7
thugs, 60 percent poor youths who needed a job, and 30 percent ideologically dedicated
youth." 81 This open recruitment system provides the regime an ability to survive political
or military disruption, making the targeting of elite forces difficult.
78 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (Boulder: Westview Press,
1988), 19.
79 Ayoob, "Perspectives From the Gulf: Regime Security or Regional Security," 108.
80 Ibid.
81 Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 19SS), 192.
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3. Internal Control Through Economic Distribution
The second form of internal control, that Third World regimes share is the ability
to regulate the distribution of economic resources. David proposes that the "power of the
Third World state...derives from the ability to distribute goods."52 For many Third World
regimes, economic control is easier to maintain than suppression. For example, according
to Christopher Clapham, "When the piped water supply or the tarmac road went to the
ruling party's constituency, and stopped sharply at the boundary with the opposition one, it
did not take the people across that boundary long to perceive the virtues of loyalty." 83
Controlling resources is equivalent in these regimes to maintaining internal stability.84 The
behavior associated with this control has been termed the "politics of accommodation."85
The regime leadership rewards the loyalty of the most powerful elite groups. Those in the
periphery following that have no power or represent potential opposition are suppressed
through a withholding of economic support. This behavior has been recognized as a
significant obstacle to economic development in the Third World.86
Barry Ames addresses the politics of accommodation in an analysis of Latin
American regime behavior. He concludes that Latin American regimes focused on a
combination of five budgeting strategies of control.87 The basis for the categorization of
these strategies was the portion of the periphery following they were designed to
82 David, Choosing Sides
,
13.
82 Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1985), 66.
84 Robert L. Rothstein, The Weak in the World of the Strong, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977), 182.
85 Ibid. Rothstein credits R. Crawford Pratt with coining this phrase.
86 Ibid., 183.
87 Barry Ames, Political Survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 19S7), 212.
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accommodate. The first budgeting strategy involved increasing the military budget to hedge
against military opposition." The second strategy focused on paying for the loyalty of civil
government officials. The third attacked potential regional opposition by buying security
through funding of desired local needs." Transfer payments, such as social security, were
the basis of the fourth strategy, which targeted an unorganized, potentially hostile
population. The last strategy was aimed at a particular societal class and provided funding
based on the target's desires."
Each of these strategies requires a continuous flow of economic resources to the
regime leadership. For the purpose of formulating deterrence policies, it is not important
to recognize which budgeting strategy is being followed. What is important, however, is
determining the source of the economic benefits. If the source can be threatened, it is
conceivable that the authoritarian regime would perceive its internal control to be threatened
as well.
The economies of most Third World nations are dependent on few, and in many
cases, a single export. As a result, many regimes become extremely vulnerable to
fluctuations in world commodity prices and, if the export is agricultural, to weather
conditions. 51 This vulnerability directly influences the frequency of coups d'etat in the Third
World. Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, for example, examined 52 Third World countries that
" Ibid., 213. In regimes such as Khadaffi's Libya or Hussein's Iraq, it might only be
necessary to placate the elite security forces who could be used to crush any military
opposition to the regime.
" Ibid. An example of this would be the funding of a hospital or school in a particular
region. Ames recognizes that the political capital of this strategy could only be collected
after the project was completed. Thus, this is a strategy of last resort.
90 Ibid. Ames provides the example of a regime funding education at the expense of
the military to placate the working middle class.
" Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa , 27.
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depended on a single export for 50% or more of their export receipts." Of that 52, only 14
had not experienced a coup." Inclusion of those nations which have a single export
dependency of 40% or more was also revealing. Twelve out of a possible 15 nations
experienced coups."
While O'Kane's analysis may appear convincing, the empirical relationship between
single export dependence and the vulnerability of Third World authoritarian regimes is not
clear cut." The economic vulnerability of Third World regimes is more complex than the
argument focusing on single exports. For many regimes, the combination of a dependence
on critical imports, such as oil, with potential shortfalls of basic necessities, such as food
crops, results in the vulnerable situation O'Kane describes." A lack of industry and
manufacturing capabilities is another characteristic that leads to regime susceptibility to
coups."
Whatever the influence of single export dependence on regime vulnerability, it can
be concluded that interruptions in the ability to export that commodity will have an adverse
affect on the economy of that nation. If the regime does depend on a budgeting strategy
to maintain control, threatening its ability to continue exporting could potentially be
perceived as threats to regime security.
" Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, The Likelihood of Coups (Aldershot, England: Avebury,
1987), 48.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
" Thompson empirically tested the hypothesis that "systems experiencing economic
deterioration tend to be more prone to military coups." While he did not specifically define
economic deterioration in terms of export dependence, he was able to prove that the
evidence is only partially consistent with the hypothesis. Thompson, 472 - 475.
" Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," 11.
" Ibid.
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C. TARGETING INTERNAL CONTROL
The discussion of the internal control mechanisms of suppression and economic
distribution provides potential categories of targets to threaten to deter Third World
authoritarian regimes. The purpose of this section is to identify these targets in general
terms. It is recognized that a specific targeting strategy must be tailored to individual
situations.
1. Targeting Suppression
Targeting the mechanisms of suppression focuses primarily on the elite security
forces. Threatening the neutralization of these forces, for example in Khadaffi's
dictatorship, would remove the internal restraint on the military forces which present the
greatest threat to the regime. In Hussein's regime, targeting the elite forces threatens the
elimination of the loyal core following which serves as the direct defense of the government
against a potentially hostile regular military force.
In addition to targeting the forces themselves, the command and control of those
forces must also be threatened. The regime must perceive that if deterrence fails, it will
quickly become isolated. It must be made evident to the dictatorship that the external
deterrent threat represents a genuine risk of being overthrown.
In the recent Gulf War, declaratory statements by President George Bush clearly
indicated that the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime was not a war objective. 9
!
Hussein did
appear, however, to be concerned with the security of his regime. In fact, while analysts are
" When asked if overthrowing Hussein was being considered a U.S. objective, Bush
answered, "Well it wouldn't disappoint me if the Iraqis got up and said ['] Look this man is
our problem. ..['] but I've spelled out our objectives here, and I. ..stopped short of adding to
them..." The objectives to which Bush referred were listed in his opening statement: "The
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of
Kuwait's legitimate government, the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and the
protection of American citizens." "Excerpts from President's News Conference on Gulf
Crisis," New York Times . 31 August 1990, All.
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still trying to explain why chemical weapons were not used in the Gulf War," statements
by Hussein indicate that he may have been trying to use the threat of chemical use to deter
attacks on his regime. In a 30 August 1990 interview, Hussein was asked if he might use
chemical weapons to save Iraq. He replied, "I haven't said this. What I'm saying is that
Iraq is an independent sovereign state, and whoever attacks Iraq to change the government
or to destroy Iraq, then they should expect that Iraq is not going to be an easy bite to
swallow." 100 Hussein repeated this warning, during the war, in an interview with Peter Amett
of the Cable News Network. In the interview, Hussein stated, "We have maintained our
balance using only conventional weapons...We pray we shall not be forced into taking a
forced measure...." 101 Hussein asserted that his missiles could deliver chemical, biological,
or nuclear warheads and that using such weapons may be necessary to preserve Iraq. 102
The aforementioned evidence does support omnibalancing as a description of Third
World behavior and highlights the potential of omnibalancing for deterrence. There is no
clear evidence, however, that if the leaders of the United States and Iraq were consciously
pursuing deterrence policies, the targeted nation received and understood the threat.
2. Targeting Economic Distribution
In order to predict the effect of targeting the means of Third World economic
distribution, it is useful to review the body of literature on economic sanctions. Sanctions
99 John Tagliabue, "Iraqi Weapons had Chemical Warheads," New York Times
, 12
November 1991, A3.
100
"Excerpts From Interview with Hussein on Crisis in Gulf," New York Times , 31
August 1990, A10.
101 Robert D. McFadden, "Hussein Hints Use of All His Weapons," New York Times
,
29 January 1991, A12. According to Amett, the interview was initiated by Hussein who
surprised the interviewer by having him brought to the bungalow where the interview took
place. One possible explanation of this is that Hussein may have felt it necessary to reissue
his warning due to the impending ground war.
10
:
Ibid.
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are similar to the results of a counter-economic strike in that they both aim to disrupt the
regime's source of revenue. According to Robert E. Looney and Craig Knouse, economic
sanctions are "coercive measures directed toward political objectives."103 The goal of the
sanctions is to weaken the target nation's economy so that the regime leadership will alter
its behavior. 1 M There is little consensus on the question of whether economic sanctions are
successful in influencing the targeted decision-makers. Arguments about the efficiency of
sanctions surfaced in the early stages of the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf. Advocates
of the use of military force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait argued that there is little
historical evidence that the economic sanctions would work. 1 "
Three causes can explain the historical failure of sanctions. According to Looney
and Knouse, "It is...unrealistic to expect all countries to cooperate fully in imposing a total
embargo against a target state. The lack of universality of application has indeed been a
major cause of the failure of sanctions..." 1 " Therefore, the inadequacy of enforcement at
the international level is the first cause of sanction failure.
The second reason why economic sanctions can fail is the inability of the imposing
nations to predict the response of the target state. 1 '' Presently, the United Nations is
maintaining sanctions on Iraq to ensure compliance with the terms of the Gulf War
ceasefire. While there is clear evidence that the sanctions are crippling the Iraqi economy,
101 Robert E. Looney and Craig Knouse, "Predicting the Success of Economic
Sanctions," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13 (No. 2 1991): 40.
10< Ibid.
105 Interestingly, the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.), argued in favor of sanctions.
The C.I.A.'s argument was based on the assertion that Iraq would be forced to deplete its
foreign reserves and would in a matter of months, be unable to maintain basic services. Ibid,
42.
106
Ibid., 50.
107 Ibid.
70
it is not apparent that the Ba'ath party is in danger of being overthrown.108 In fact, the
Ba'ath regime is using the external threat of sanctions in an attempt to unify its periphery
following. 1 cs In the case of Libya, the United Nations Security Council threatened economic
sanctions in March 1992, as punishment for a failure to cooperate in an international
investigation of alleged Libyan terrorists.110 Describing the effect the sanctions would have
on Khadaffi's peripheral following, Mansour Kikhia, an opposition leader stated, "We worry
about sanctions or military actions that can only hurt the Libyan people. The issue in Libya
is that people in this case think the West is out to get Libya, not Muammar Qaddafi (sic)
and his clique." 111 In both Iraq and Libya, therefore, sanctions tend to strengthen the
loyalty of the periphery rather than incite rebellion.
The third cause of the failure of sanctions is the ability of target nations to
implement plans to alleviate their impact. 112 Again, the current Iraqi case is a good example.
Economic sanctions are not leakproof and the longer a regime can survive, the more difficult
it becomes for the sanctions to make a difference.
Even in cases that analysts argue are sanction success stories, sanctions alone rarely
result in the overthrow of a regime. One such case is Idi Amin in Uganda. Less than six
108 To placate the Iraqi periphery following, Hussein is "printing money, raising salaries
of key military and government personnel and lowering gasoline prices." Patrick E. Tyler,
"Who's Talking Tough? Why Saddam Hussein," New York Times , 24 October 1991,*A4.
105 Iraqi Oil Minister, Osama A. R. al-Hiti, rejected an United Nations proposal that
allowed Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil to finance the purchase of food and medicine
stating, "They are trying to change our Government, and it's not going to happen." Patrick
E. Tyler, "Iraqi Oil Minister Rejects U.N. Plan," New York Times
, 25 October 1991, A4.
110 The sanctions included a ban on flights to or from Libya, a ban on arms and aircraft
sales, and a reduction in the number of Libyan diplomats in U.N. member nations. Youssef
M. Ibrahim, "Sanctions on Libya Likely To Fuel Qaddafi's Chaos," New York Times , 1 April
1992, A6.
111 Ibid.
112 Looney and Knouse, 50.
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months after the United States established a total trade ban with Uganda in October 197S,
Idi Amin's regime was overthrown. The most significant impetus for the coup, however, was
the indirect effect the U.S. trade boycott had on international investment in Uganda.
Western corporations closed their Ugandan offices and oil companies became unwilling to
provide credit to Amin. Without oil or foreign capital, Amin could not transport Ugandan
coffee for export and therefore lost his primary source of income.11 ' Thus, although the
U.S. trade ban did not directly threaten Amin's internal control, the sanctions were
successful because of their effect on Uganda's base of economic support.
If the goal of economic sanctions is similar to that of a counter-control strike
against mechanisms of economic distribution, there are also significant differences. One
such difference is the means of attaining the goal. Sanctions prevent a regime from
exporting its dominant product. In contrast, counter- control targeting threatens the
destruction of the capabilities dictators need for export extraction. Presumably, in the latter
case, the economic destruction would be rapid and the targeted regime would have a more
difficult time preparing strategies to soften the blow.111 Failures of sanctions due to
enforcement difficulties would not be applicable to a military strike that could destroy the
physical means a regime uses to extract, transport or refine its primary export.
In O'Kane's analysis of the 67 nations which depend on a single export for 40%
or more of their export earnings, the following categories of exports are represented: (1)
petroleum or petroleum products; (2) minerals/metals; (3) food products; and (4) non-food
llJ Judith Miller, "When Sanctions Worked," Foreign Policy No. 39 (Summer 1930):
122 - 123.
114 An illustrative case is the situation in Zaire in late 1991. Violence and destruction
significantly disrupted copper and cobalt mining and led to rapid disintegration of the
economy. See Jane Perez, "Violence Kills Dozens in Zaire Mining Town," New York Times ,
28 October 1991, A6; and Kenneth B. Novle, "In Zaire, Fear and Despair Grow as Economy
Slides into Chaos," New York Times , 4 November 1991, A4.
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agriculture. 115 The targeting of these exports might focus on the source, storage or
transportation facilities.
Targeting the source, such as the oil fields for petroleum products, would be the
most efficient means of destroying the regime's ability to export its dominant product. The
economic destruction, however, would not easily be reversed. If it was successful in
overthrowing the regime, the new leadership would face formidable economic dilemmas.
Also, especially when petroleum is involved, allied and domestic support for such targeting
would be unlikely. The target selection of the 1986 U.S. raid on Libya demonstrates this
point.
Prior to the 1986 conflict, the Reagan administration had been conducting a
campaign, launched in 1981, to promote the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar
Khadaffi.m There were several reasons for this American initiative but perhaps the most
important was Khadaffi's sponsorship of international terrorism against the West. 117
In 1986, Khadaffi's regime appeared vulnerable to a coup. The falling price of oil
had seriously disrupted the Libyan economy. 1 LS Khadaffi's consolidation of power and
adventurous foreign policy at the expense of internal development had angered religious
leaders and technocrats. More significantly, the regular military forces were resentful of
their lack of autonomy at the hands of the elite revolutionary guard. 115
11! O'Kane, 45 - 49.
116 Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West: Headlong into Confrontation?," International
Affairs 58 (Winter 1981/1982): 13.
117 David, Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security, 57.
111 Libya is dependent on oil exports for the majority of their export earnings. Prior to
the 1969 coup that brought Khadaffi to power, petroleum accounted for 99 percent of
Libyan export earnings and 95 percent of Libyan gross national product. O'Kane, 71.
119 David, Third World Coup d'Etat and International Security
, 58.
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In April 1986, following the terrorist bombing of a nightclub in Berlin in which one
American soldier had been killed, U.S. naval and air force aircraft bombed targets in
Libya. 120 While Khadaffi's regime was economically dependent on its oil exports, the
facilities associated with the Libyan oil industry were not targeted. 121 One explanation of
this omission is that the destruction of economic targets could not be credibly linked to the
anti-terrorist signal the Reagan administration was attempting to send. 122
Another planning consideration might have been a concern about the effect of
counter-economic strikes on U.S. allies. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, of Great
Britain, allowed U.S. aircraft based in England to take part in the raid as long as the strike
entailed only "action directed against specific Libyan targets demonstrably involved in the
conduct and support of terrorist activities...."121 These same aircraft were denied overflight
rights by the governments of France and Spain.124 Although many factors influenced the
French and Spanish decisions, Frederick Zilian Jr. argues that one factor was the economic
relationship these countries shared with Libya. 1 2: The Libyan case highlights the difficulty
in targeting the source of the exports that are vital to nations allied with the United States.
Targeting storage facilities is less likely to agitate allied consumers, although the
proximity of storage to the source may be such as to make the discriminate destruction of
121 Ibid.
121 W. Hays Parks, "Crossing the Line," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 112
(November 1986): 47.
122 Ibid.
121 Joseph Lelyveld, "Intense Talks Led to Thatcher Ruling," New York Times , 16 April
1986, A14.
124 Frederick Zilian, Jr., "The U.S. Raid on Libya - and NATO," Orbis 30 (Fall 1986):
514 - 517.
125 Ibid. In 1984, Spain was the third largest trading partner with Libya and France was
the fourth. Additionally, Libya provided 80% of Spain's natural gas and 5% of France's oil
imports.
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storage impossible. The transportation facilities may be the least objectionable from the
standpoint of the new regime that comes to power, but it may also be the most complex for
targeting due to the number of ways the export could be moved. Targeting storage or
transportation facilities, while politically more viable than destroying the source, would result
also in a longer time needed for the strategy to have an impact.
In summary, targeting the mechanisms of internal control involves targeting means
of suppression and economic distribution. The former involves targeting the elite security
forces and command and control nodes. The latter includes primarily the source, storage
facilities or means of transportation of the Third World dictatorship's dominant export.
D. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis was based on one significant assumption which bears repeating.
This was the acceptance of the logic behind the theory of omnibalancing. It seems unlikely
that a single theory can predict behavior of Third World dictators considering their diverse
backgrounds. Third World nations differ in their economies, politics, culture, and history.
Additionally, they differ in the amount of time they have been sovereign and thus the
amount of experience they have in self-government. More importantly perhaps, for this
discussion, they differ in military capabilities and security requirements.
There is, however, a large aggregate of literature that indicates there is a preoccupation
among Third World authoritarian regimes with potential internal threats to their power.
Omnibalancing does appear to be a logical extension of this concept. Also, the literature on
coups d'etat and budgeting strategies does support omnibalancing behavior.
Omnibalancing does provide a useful point of departure for considering nuclear
deterrence policies for the Third World authoritarian regimes. Threatening the internal
mechanisms of suppression and economic distribution should at least, influence the decision-
making process of Third World dictators. Unfortunately, the only true measure of
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deterrence is if it fails and conflict ensues. Obviously, if the goal of deterrence is to prevent
nuclear use by Third World powers, the United States cannot afford this conclusive test. A
less expensive means of testing the viability of a Third World deterrence policy based on
omnibalancing is to compare it to previous policies and their associated targeting strategies.
This comparison is the focus of the next chapter.
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IV. COMPARISON OF OMNIBALANCING TO PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 59
A PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 59
The theory of omnibalancing and the implications for Third World nuclear deterrence
have been presented. It might seem that omnibalancing presents a new challenge in terms
of developing a deterrent targeting strategy. The assumption that Third World dictators are
influenced by perceived internal threats to their regime, however, was made by the Carter
administration regarding Soviet decision-making. This analysis of Soviet behavior
contributed to a re-evaluation of U.S. strategic targeting in the late 1970's. The result was
codified as Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59) and signed by President Jimmy Carter on 25
July 19S0. 1 The similarity between PD-59's description of Soviet perceptions and the theory
of omnibalancing provides an excellent opportunity for testing the viability of a nuclear
deterrence policy aimed at authoritarian Third World regimes. Criticisms of PD-59 can be
applied to omnibalancing to evaluate its utility as the basis for deterrence. The comparison
of PD-59 to omnibalancing is the purpose of this chapter.
1. Historical Setting
During the 1976 Presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Carter doubted that
the Nixon/Ford administration's deterrence strategy of limited nuclear warfare and selected
nuclear options was possible or necessary. 2 President Richard M. Nixon had signed
1 Jeffrey Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization
Program," Journal of Strategic Studies , 6 (June 1983): 125.
1 Desmond J. Ball, Developments in U. S. Strategic Nuclear Policy Under the Carter
Administration Working Paper No. 17 (Canberra: The Strategic and Defense Studies Centre,
The Australian National University, 1979), 4.
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National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242) on 17 January 1974. 3 One
unique aspect of NSDM-242 was its emphasis on counter-recovery targets. The objective
of this targeting was to destroy the assets needed for the Soviet Union to recover as a world
power after a nuclear exchange.* This destruction was specified at 70% of the Soviet
economic base.'
After his inauguration, President Carter commissioned a series of studies evaluating
the American strategic posture and exploring different approaches to nuclear deterrence vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union. One such study, the National Targeting Policy Review, was assigned
to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, in the summer of 1977. 6 Brown reported the results
in 1978. The principles of this study were then integrated into the planning requirements
of U.S. nuclear strategy. 7
A detailed account of a shift in nuclear targeting philosophy was provided in the
January7 1980 Report of the Secretary of Defense. Harold Brown summarized the
philosophy, stating:
Articulation of the principles of our [targeting policy] focuses us on an
obvious but too often ignored point: to deter effectively we must affect
the perceptions of Soviet leaders whose values, objectives, and incentives
differ sharply from our own. ..[There is] every reason to believe that the
Soviet leadership has in fact been deterred and can continue to be, not
by theory, but recognition of the certain costs of aggression to things
! Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence Adelphi Paper No. 1S5 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), 18.
' Ibid., 19.
5 Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of
Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1978 Part 2 , 95th Cong., 1st sess., 212.
1 See Thomas Powers, "Choosing a Strategy for World War III," Atlantic Monthly 250
(November 1982): 91; and Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," International
Security 5 (Spring 1981): 20 - 21.
7 Slocombe, 21.
7S
most valued by that leadership. 8
PD-59 was the directive implementing this shift in targeting emphasis outlined in Brown's
1980 report.
2. Targeting Shift
The Carter administration's National Targeting Policy Review concluded that
successful deterrence was dependent on holding at risk what the Soviet leadership valued the
most. This conclusion is also the premise behind deterrence based on onmibalancing. In
order to evaluate the selection of Third World targets to hold at risk, it is useful to review
how PD-59 translated the perception of Soviet values into a potential target set.
In a speech at the Naval War College in August 1980, Secretary Brown publicly
revealed, in general terms, the Soviet targets to be threatened for deterrence. "It is our
policy.. .to ensure that the Soviet leadership knows that. ..we could. ..exact an unacceptably
high price in the things the Soviet leaders appear to value most - political and military
control, military force both nuclear and conventional, and the industrial capability7 to sustain
a war."' The Soviet leadership would thus be threatened with attacks on the mechanisms
that were being used to maintain its power base. PD-59 articulated a targeting emphasis on
Soviet political and military leadership, strategic military targets, and other military targets. 10
The resulting target set increased the National Strategic Target List from 25,000 to 40,000
targets. 11
I Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the
Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981 - 1985
Defense Programs (January 29, 1980) (Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office,
1980): 82 - 83.
• Harold Brown, "The Flexibility of Our Plans," Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 October
1980, 743.
1C Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program,"
129.
II Ibid.
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The leadership target category can be separated into three sets: the leadership
itself, the lines of communication between the leadership and the organizations of control,
and these organizations themselves. 12 The term "other military targets" refers to targets
other than the Soviet strategic nuclear systems and the military and political leadership, and
includes conventional military forces and their bases, chemical and biological weapons
capabilities, and space facilities. 11 By targeting "other military targets" the United States
hoped to obtain three objectives. The first was to prevent the Soviets from establishing
control over areas not already under their power. In the event the Soviets did gain
command of these areas, the second objective was to ensure they could not maintain it. The
third objective was to inflict costly destruction on Soviet military forces. 1 *
The target set envisioned in PD-59 would not only threaten to destroy the
hardened shelters that housed the central government's party officials, but also the hundreds
of Communist Party cadre leaders at all levels throughout the country. 15 Organizations,
such as the KGB and economic planning councils, which assisted in maintaining control of
the Soviet communist regime, also were targeted. 16 Additionally, the target set included
troops on the Soviet-Chinese border and Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe."
According to Jeffrey Richelson, the objective of such targeting was to destroy the internal
mechanisms of Soviet political control "either by killing the leadership itself, making it
[i Jeffrey T. Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," Comparative
Strategy 2 (No.3 19S0): 226.
13 Desmond Ball, "Toward a Critique of Strategic Nuclear Targeting," in Desmond Ball
and Jeffrey Richelson, ed., Strategic Nuclear Targeting, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986), 23.
14 Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 229.
15 Powers, 109.
lf Ibid.
17 Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 226.
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impossible for the leadership to communicate with its subordinates, or destroying the means
(people and facilities) by which the leadership's orders are carried out." 18
3. The Utility of Ethnic Targeting
An extreme variant of threatening the source of Soviet internal control is the
exploitation of the ethnic heterogeneity within the Soviet Union. The Soviet population
represented 100 distinct nationalities residing in fifteen republics. 1 ' The largest republic, the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, itself was a conglomeration of sixteen sub-
republics, five regions and ten national areas. 20 Ethnic Russians, although by population a
minority7
,
dominated the positions of political and military leadership. 21 Therefore, it could
be argued that the deliberate targeting of ethnic Russians would result in the destruction of
Soviet control of the various non-Russian nationalities. The hope behind such an ethnic
targeting plan would be that the other nationalities, once "liberated" of Russian domination,
would resist Soviet war objectives and, in effect, shut down the operation of the Soviet
government. 22 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, indicated an
acceptance of the logic of ethnic targeting by interrupting a nuclear war plan brief to ask
how many ethnic Russians were being targeted.22
18 Ibid., 227.
15 Steve F. Kime, "How the Soviet Union is Ruled," Air Force Magazine 63 (March
1980): 54 - 55.
20 Ibid., 55.
21 Ibid., 57.
22 Bernard S. Albert, "Constructive Counterpower," Orbis 20 (Summer 1976): 362.
23 Powers, 86.
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There is no evidence that PD-59 targeted ethnic population groups. 2 * The concept
of ethnic targeting is significant, however, because it is an extension of the counter-control
argument referred to in PD-59. An argument in favor of ethnic targeting could also be
supported by the theory of omnibalancing. The ethnic makeup of authoritarian Third World
states closely resembles that of the former Soviet Union in that both are heterogeneous and
controlled by ethnic minorities. Because of its potential applicability to Third World nuclear
deterrence, a further discussion of the utility of ethnic targeting is warranted.
While the logic of ethnic targeting appears to be complementary to deterrence
based on omnibalancing, there are reasons to doubt its utility for enhancing the deterrent
threats discussed in the last chapter. There are two objections to implementing a Third
World ethnic targeting strategy: (1) the moral revulsion to a deliberate form of genocide;
and (2) the improbability of ethnic targeting as effective deterrence.
Targeting ethnic groups is actually a plan for threatening genocide. As such, it
would be morally unacceptable for Americans to support." Even as a response to a Third
World nuclear attack, the United States would enjoy little international acceptance of
deliberate ethnic destruction. George Quester argues, "Even if [ethnic targeting] were indeed
to produce fewer fatalities than old-fashioned massive retaliation, its sheer cold-blooded
deliberation is likely to offend the moral sensitivities of much of the world, of our allies as
well as of the neutrals."- 5 The second objection to ethnic targeting in the Third World is
the probability that it would not enhance deterrence. Omnibalancing predicts that
authoritarian regimes will be influenced by threats to their base of power. This is not
u George H. Quester, "Ethnic Targeting: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come,"
Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (June 1982): 230.
25 Quester, 232.
2t Ibid.
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necessarily synonymous, however, with threats to their ethnic heritage or ancestral tribe.
In fact, the ethnic group represented by the regime leadership is not safe from persecution
by the regime to ensure internal security. Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime in Iraq
demonstrates this point. Hussein represents a minority population who are of Arab descent
and Sunni Islamic faith. 27 Yet upon becoming President in 1979, Hussein did not hesitate
in purging his own Ba'ath party and arresting over 100 potential oppositionists. 28 It is
unlikely that threatening the indiscriminate annihilation of Sunni Arabs would enhance a
nuclear deterrence policy against Saddam Hussein. Therefore, for the reasons of moral
objection and questionable utility, ethnic targeting is rejected as a component of Third
World nuclear deterrence. 29
The message broadcast to the Soviet Union by Secretary Brown's declarations was
that if deterrence failed, the American response would not necessarily be one of massive
retaliation. Rather, the Soviet regime risked the destruction of its internal base of power and
control. Thus, the targets selected in PD-59 appear to be precisely what would threaten a
Third World dictator who behaves in accordance with the predictions offered by the
omnibalancing theory. Brown, in fact, described Soviet behavior in a manner that is very
similar to omnibalancing:
[In] a time of great crisis what [the Soviets] most need to be deterred by
is the thought that their power structure will not survive. That is even
more important to them than their personal survival or survival of 10, 20,
27 The Iraqi population is composed of 75% Arabs and 20% Kurds. The remaining
population is of a Turkish or Assyrian lineage. In terms of religious demographics, Iraq is
approximately 95% Islamic, of which 55% is Shi'ite and 40% Sunni. The remaining 5% is
chiefly of the Christian faith. Since the majority of Iraqis of the Sunni faith are Kurdish, the
regime leadership represents only 20% of the population. See Michael G. Cooper, "The Iran-
Iraq War and Lessons for the Future," (Naval War College, 1989), 10; and King, 8-9.
21 Cordesman and Wagner, 28.
29 Quester proposes an additional objection with respect to the Soviet Union. He
argues that the Soviets could retaliate with their own form of ethnic targeting along racial
lines. As was discussed in Chapter I, the lack of a second-strike capability in the Third
World precludes the applicability of this criticism to omnibalancing. Quester, 232.
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or 30 million, or even 50 million of their fellow countrymen."
For successful deterrence, it was necessary that the Soviets perceived the targeting focus of
PD-59 as a credible threat to their internal security. Whether this was achieved and the
applicability of PD-59 to the Third World is the focus of the following sections.
B. THE CRITICISMS OF PD-59 AND THIRD WORLD DETERRENCE
The targeting philosophy of PD-59 did not enjoy universal acceptance among strategic
analysts. Because of the similarity between the assumptions of Soviet behavior contained in
PD-59 and the assumptions of Third World behavior predicted by omnibalancing, a critique
of PD-59 can be utilized in evaluating the viability of omnibalancing as the basis for a Third
World nuclear deterrence policy. The purpose of this section is not to evaluate the validity
of the criticisms of PD-59. Rather, this section will determine whether the opposing
arguments to PD-59 apply to a targeting strategy based on omnibalancing. The critique of
PD-59 focuses on five problems: (1) the shortcomings of intelligence; (2) the effects of
counter-control targeting; (3) the response of the Soviet population; and (4) the lack of
American capabilities. This section will explore each area reviewing the basis of each
argument and evaluating the applicability for deterring Third World dictators.
1 . Shortcomings of Intelligence
A basic intelligence problem regarding the counter-control targeting of PD-59 is
identifying the locations of all the shelters that would house the regime leadership during a
crisis. Secretary Brown conceded this point in his 1980 Defense Report. He stated,
"Hardened command posts have been constructed near Moscow and other cities. For the
some 100,000 people we define as the Soviet leadership, there are hardened underground
shelters. ..The relatively few leadership shelters we have identified would be vulnerable to
" Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear War Strategy , 96th
Cong., 2d sess., 16 September 19S0, 27.
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direct attack." 31 But even the knowledge of all shelter location would not help in identifying
which shelters housed the key individuals.u Additionally, critics argue that attacking such
things as the KGB headquarters would be of limited utility because the essential people
would not be there in times of crisis, especially since the U.S. declaratory policy has
identified them as targets. 33 Soviet military forces would also prove difficult to target
because of their mobility. Also, the sensor systems used to track the movement of such
forces were probably high on the Soviet list of targets to be attacked upon initiation of
hostilities.' 4
The intelligence problems associated with implementing the PD-59 targeting
strategy would also impede targeting of Third World regime control assets. For example,
when General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked at a press
conference, during the Gulf War, why coalition forces were not targeting Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein, he replied, "We were not [targeting Hussein] because frankly I have
learned from previous experience how difficult it can be to track a head of state in whom
you might be interested. And I think we spent a good part of the morning of the 20th of
December 1989 in this room discussing that subject." 3 ! General Powell was referring to the
difficulty U.S. forces had in locating Panamanian dictator, General Manuel Noriega, during
Operation Just Cause in December 1989. The declaratory U.S. policy in the Gulf War
31 Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the
Congress on the FY 1981 Budget
, 78, emphasis added.
12 Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy
,
99.
33 Ibid.
34 Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 233.
35
"Excerpts From Remarks by Cheney and Powell on War Effort," New York Times
,
18 January 1991, A9.
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emphasized that Hussein was not a target." In contrast, during Operation Just Cause, the
location and capture of Noriega was announced as an objective of the U.S. invasion. 57
Therefore, the Panamanian conflict serves as an effective example of the limitations of U.S.
intelligence capabilities in the Third World.
In the initial phase of Operation Just Cause, U.S. special forces unsuccessfully
struck seven locations where intelligence sources estimated Noriega to be." In fact, the
planning for the Panama operation was allegedly predicated by a lack of confidence in
intelligence being accurate.' s The Bush administration resorted to offering a $1 million
bounty for information leading to Noriega's capture. 4 ' In the end, Noriega was located only
after he entered the Vatican embassy seeking asylum, four days after the U.S. invasion."
The implication of the U.S. experience in Panama and the Persian Gulf is that if
a counter-control targeting strategy was implemented against a Third World regime,
" Since the end of the Gulf War, it has been speculated that Hussein had indeed been
targeted. The staff of U. S. News and World Report records that on 27 February 1991, the
United States attempted to destroy an Iraqi command bunker where Hussein was believed
to be. With the use of a specially designed, concrete-penetrating bomb, the bunker was
allegedly destroyed, killing several high-level Iraqi military commanders. Hussein was
obviously not among them. U. S. News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory: The
Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times Books, 1992), 391.
37 The objectives of Operation Just Cause were: to assist the legitimately elected
Panamanian government; protect American lives and treaty rights to the Panama Canal; and
seize and extradite Noriega to the United States for prosecution on drug trafficking.
"Excerpts From Statement By Baker on U.S. Policy," New York Times , 21 December 19S9,
A19.
18 Bernard E. Trainor, "Hundreds of Tips but Still No Noriega," New York Times, 23
December 1989, 113.
" Bernard E. Trainor, "Gaps in Vital Intelligence Hampered U.S. Troops," New York
Times , 21 December 1989, A21.
40 Trainor, "Hundreds of Tips but Still No Noriega," 113.
41 Larry Rohter, "Noriega Eludes U. S.," New York Times . 25 December 1989, Al.
It should be noted that although Noriega was not located for four days, during that time he
was on the run and had been effectively removed from any control in Panama.
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American planners would have a difficult time locating the regime leadership. Therefore, the
critical appraisal of intelligence support for the PD-59 targeting strategy applies to the Third
World as well. In fact, if it can be assumed that the majority of U.S. intelligence resources,
analysts and training has been dedicated to the Soviet Union over the past four decades, the
lack of experience and attention devoted to the Third World may exacerbate this problem.
There are some characteristics of Third World authoritarian regimes, however, that assist in
easier intelligence gathering than was possible against the Soviet Union/ : Unlike the Soviet
leadership, Third World dictators do not enjoy the level of border security inherent in a true
totalitarian state. Thus, compared to the Soviet Union, Third World states are easily
penetrated by human or technical means of intelligence collection/' Additionally, Third
World regimes are often dependent on Western technological assistance. In contrast to the
Soviet state, this dependence allows greater access by foreigners and greater opportunity for
obtaining adequate targeting intelligence/ 4 Whether or not this opportunity will be exploited
depends on the success of the U.S. intelligence agencies taking measures to focus more
resources towards the Third World. Although some actions have been taken in this
42 For an analysis of the difficulties U.S. intelligence agencies had in collecting strategic
intelligence on the Soviet Union, see John Prados, The Soviet Estimate (New York: The Dial
Press, 1982)
4> As an example, months after the end of the Gulf War, the Central Intelligence
Agency reportedly deployed officers to Jordan, exploiting the open overland access into Iraq
to gather intelligence about the stability7 of Hussein's regime. Patrick Tyler, "Hounding
Hussein," New York Times
,
20 March 1992, A6. For further discussion of the permeability
of Third World states, see Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1982), especially Chapter VI.
u Andrew M. Scott, 12. For example, in Libya, thousands of foreign technicians,
including Americans work in the Libyan oil industry. Paul Lewis, "Libyans Riot at
Embassies; U.N. Protests," New York Times , 3 April 1992, A5.
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direction, it is difficult to assess the future prospects of collecting the required targeting
information. 15
2. The Effects of Counter-Control Targeting
While the preceding arguments questioned the capability to execute PD-59
targeting, many analysts also criticized two aspects of the premise behind the strategy. The
first was the applicability of counter-control targeting to actual Soviet values. The second
aspect addressed the desirability' to target the Soviet command leadership. Both of these will
be examined in this section.
Although it might not be a strategic revelation to assume that any regime would
fear a loss of its control, the philosophy underlying the targeting doctrine of PD-59 rests on
more than common sense. What made PD-59 attractive as a deterrence policy was the
susceptibility of the Soviet political system to attacks on its control mechanisms. Advocates
of PD-59 propose that the overcentralization of Soviet political and military authority- would
have left the Soviet regime extremely vulnerable to isolation from counter-control attacks.
It is argued, for example, that the elimination of the KGB might have led to the inability of
the Soviet Union to function effectively. 4 ' In this view, a counter-control strategy would
pose a credible threat to the Soviet leadership. According to Colin Gray, the large scale
counter-recovery strikes envisioned by the Nixon/Ford administrations would be incredible
as threats because of the inevitable Soviet retaliation that would follow. However, "a war
plan directed at the destruction of Soviet power would have inherent plausibility in Soviet
<! In the 1992 Defense Authorization Act, Congress initiated a restructuring of the
defense intelligence organization partly in response to the inability of U. S. assets to locate
Hussein in the Gulf War. William Matthews, "Congress Gives DIA Day-to-Day Authority,"
Navy Times
,
9 December 1991, 33. The Central Intelligence Agency has also been
reorganized to shift its focus away from the former Soviet Union and towards acquiring the
capabilities to satisfy regional intelligence requirements. Elaine Sciolino, "C.I.A. Casting
About for New Missions," New York Times , 4 February 1992, Al and A4.
,! Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory is Possible," Foreign Policy 39 (Summer
19S0): 21.
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estimation. "v Gray refers to the structure of Soviet society to justify his claim. The very
fact that the Soviet Union is organized as a totalitarian, militarized state is evidence that the
leadership will consider threats to its internal control credible.48 Such indirect evidence
reveals a lack of analytical support behind the premise of PD-59. Successful deterrence
depends on the aggressor perceiving that what is being threatened will lead to a net cost.
Critics of PD-59 question whether Soviet behavior indicated a preoccupation with internal
threats to control.49
There is historical precedent for the contention that the Soviet leadership did not
place a high value on the well-being of its citizenship." History, therefore, reveals some
circumstantial, but not convincing evidence that the Soviet regime was concerned more with
the protection of its base of power than any domestic interests. Additionally, as Robert
Jervis proposes, "[E]ven if it is Communist rule that Soviet leaders value. ..they could also
believe that the party is supported by the population and would regenerate after a war...." 51
Therefore, even if the assumption of PD-59 about Soviet behavior is valid, there is still the
question of whether the target set articulated by Brown would have been perceived by the
Soviets as threatening their internal control.
a Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory7
,
" International
Security 4 (Summer 1979): 69, emphasis in original.
48 Ibid., 68.
4
' See Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy
,
105 - 106 and Keith B. Payne,
"Does the United States Need a Nuclear Warfighting Doctrine and Strategy?," in Keith A.
Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, ed., Military Strategy in Transition: Defense and
Deterrence in the 1980's (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 172 - 173.
50 Albert Wohlstetter cites the Soviet collectivization program of the 1920's which
resulted in 12-15 million deaths and the 1933 increase of grain exports at a time when
millions of Ukrainians were starving to death. Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesmen, and
Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," Commentary- 75 (June 1983): 27.
51 Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy
,
105 - 106.
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The doubts raised about the validity of the assumptions of PD-59 can also be
applied to omnibalancing and its predictions of the behavior of Third World authoritarian
regimes. Third World nuclear deterrence is predicated on holding at risk the mechanisms
these authoritarian regimes use to maintain internal control. Examples have been introduced
that indicate these regimes do behave as predicted by omnibalancing, but like the criticisms
of PD-59, it cannot be argued with assurance that targeting internal control will successfully
deter nuclear use. Additionally, Third World dictators may believe that there is popular
support for the "regeneration" of their regime after a counter-control strike. Therefore, any
deterrence policy based on omnibalancing must also account for the possibility of deterrence
failure.
The second criticism of the counter-control emphasis of PD-59 is the desirability
of destroying the Soviet control structure. The focus of this critique is the situation of
deterrence failure and what effect the employment of counter-control targeting would have
on two areas: war termination and conflict escalation. The basis of objection in the
discussion of these points is the perceived situation of MAD and the existence of a Soviet
second-strike capability.
Michael Howard argues that if the top Soviet leadership were eliminated, there
would exist no political entity with which to negotiate an end to the war. He believes it was
unreasonable to expect that, after an initial nuclear exchange, "an alternative organized
government would somehow emerge, capable, in spite of the destruction of all internal
communications networks, of taking over the affairs of State. "" According to this argument,
a counter-control strike would prevent the controlled termination of any Soviet military
operations, presumably including nuclear strikes.
52 Michael E. Howard, "On Fighting a Nuclear War," International Security 5 (Spring
19S1): 11. See also Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy , 119; and Richelson,
"The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 230.
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In addition to the problems associated with war termination, preventing the
escalation of a conflict also would become difficult after a counter-control strike. If the
attacks resulted in a disintegration of Soviet internal control, there would exist little incentive
for the Soviet leadership to limit their retaliatory response." There would be little prospect,
therefore, for intra-war deterrence. Gray proposes that, "[0]nce executed, a very large strike
against the Soviet political and administrative leadership would mean that the United States
had 'done its worst.' If the Soviet Government in the sense of [a National Command
Authority], were still able to function, it is likely that it would judge that it had little if
anything left to fear."" The deterrent threat of a counter-control strike may have even
provided the Soviet leadership with incentive to conduct a preemptive nuclear strike against
the United States
.
!!
A Third World authoritarian regime may also recognize a counter-control strike as
signaling an end to any possible restraint. Confronted with the loss of its internal control
the regime may see unrestricted retaliation as its only alternative. The Gulf War provides
a relevant example. Statements made by Saddam Hussein during the conflict implied that
he would have considered use of chemical weapons if the overthrow of his regime was
imminent. With these statements, Hussein appeared to have recognized that it was necessary
to reserve his most destructive weapons for intra-war deterrence.
If Hussein's behavior is indicative of Third World regimes, it bears similarities to
what critics of PD-59 expected of the Soviet leadership. However, this is where the
similarities end. What lends credibility to the argument against a counter- control targeting
11 Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 232.
" Colin S. Gray, "Targeting Problems for Central War," Naval War College Review 35
(January - February 1980): 13.
11 John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy 45 (Winter 1981-82):
19.
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strategy directed at the Soviets was their nuclear second-strike capability. Striking what the
Soviet regime valued most could have prompted them to unleash an unrestrained nuclear
second-strike against U.S. targets, presumably cities. In the Third World, such capabilities
do not exist. In fact, it is the United States which possesses an uncontested retaliatory
capability. According to Eric H. Amett, "a single [U.S. nuclear] land strike could entail the
destruction of the single major city - the assured destruction of the [Third World] country's
civilization - in some small countries." 56 It would be possible for the United States to
eliminate the military capability of the Third World authoritarian regime. Therefore, there
is little concern for the effects a counter-control strike has on war termination or conflict
escalation in a Third World scenario. The inability of potential nuclear armed Third World
regimes to survive a U.S. strike and to maintain the capability to retaliate precludes the
validity of applying the decapitation criticism to a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing.
3. The Response of the Soviet Population
Would the Soviet populace, freed from the shackles of central Communist rule,
react as desired by the American strategists? The answer to this question must include a
discussion of two arguments. The first concerns the amount of civilian casualties expected
in a counter-control strike. The second argument is focused on the expected reaction of
the population that survives the attack. Advocates of PD-59 argue that counter- control
targeting is attractive from a moral perspective. As a declarator}' policy, PD-59 emphasized
that it was the Soviet regime that would be destroyed, not the Soviet population. 17 Thus the
PD-59 targeting strategy distanced itself from previous ones which relied on the threat of
" Eric H. Arnett, Gunboat Diplomacy and the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation and the
U. S. Navy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 12. Amett concedes that American
decision-makers may be morally unable to target nuclear weapons at non-Soviet targets.
This point is not subject to debate in this discussion which is merely an evaluation of the
applicability of PD-59 to the Third World.
57 Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 227.
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large scale killing of innocents. The implication of counter- control targeting is that it
represents the means of reducing the death and destruction caused be a U.S. nuclear attack
because it does not specifically target population centers. In 1979, the Office of Technology
Assessment published estimates of the destruction anticipated in a nuclear exchange with the
Soviet Union." The attack scenarios were based on the counter-recovery targeting strategy
of NSDM-242. A specific case analyzed a retaliatory U.S. strike against Soviet military and
economic targets. According to the analyses, this resulted in casualties of between 50 and
100 million lives or 20 to 40% of the Soviet population." Accounting for effective Soviet
evacuation procedures, these numbers were modified to 23 to 34 million." Some advocates
of the targeting strategy of PD-59 argue that these figures are unacceptable and that PD-
59 represented a more humane alternative. 61
Critics of PD-59 contest the conclusion that the counter-control targeting doctrine
would spare massive Chilian casualties. Striking the political and military leadership would
certainly require a concentrated attack against Moscow." While other military targets may
be separated from population centers, it would not be unreasonable to assume, armed with
the knowledge of American strategy, that the Soviet leadership would have them moved into
such areas in a crisis. Counter-control targeting would, in these circumstances, include a
significant amount of counter-city7 strikes. It is difficult to perceive that the suffering
" Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War (Detroit:
Gale Research Company, 1984), ix.
»» Ibid., 100.
" Ibid.
" Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 227.
" Ibid.
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inflicted on the very people expected to revolt would not eliminate their potential for civil
unrest."
The Allied bombing campaigns of World War II provide analytical evidence to
support this claim. On 3 November 1944, the American Secretary of War established the
United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) to evaluate the effects of the Allied
bombing campaigns against Germany." Later, the USSBS was expanded to incorporate a
study of the American bombing of Japan. 6
:
The portion of the USSBS that investigated the
effects of bombing on morale are particularly significant to this discussion.
The USSBS investigators, in attempting to explain the effect the bombing had on
civilian morale, proposed several enlightening conclusions. One of these, in the case of
Germany, was that civilians that populated unbombed areas were still affected by the overall
campaign:
It appears that the raids did not have to be directed against a particular
area in order to affect adversely the morale of the population in that area.
The news of the raids in other places was effective in depressing morale
because it intensified both fears of losing the war and feelings of
helplessness, and also created anxiety about future raids against the local
area."
This conclusion conflicts with the notion that Soviet citizens would rebel after a U.S. attack.
" Howard, 11. Barbara G. Levi, Frank N. Hippel and William H. Dougherty conclude
that a U.S. nuclear attack on Soviet strategic nuclear facilities would promptly kill 12-27
million people and kill or injure 25-54 million people over a short term. Additionally, they
estimate that a worse-case U.S. attack on Soviet urban areas would result in 45-77 million
prompt deaths and 73-93 million people killed or injured soon after. Barbara G. Levi, Frank
N. Hippel and William H. Dougherty, "Civilian Casualties from 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks
on the Soviet Union," International Security 12 (Winter 1987/SS): 169.
M United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European War, Over-all Report (Washington,
D. C: Government Printing Office, 1945), IX.
«' Ibid.
Si United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European War, The Effects of Strategic
Bombing on German Morale (Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1947), 43.
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German authorities tracked the morale of their citizens throughout the war, and the
USSBS relied on this record as one source for their own evaluation.67 These German studies
indicate that lowered morale was often offset by reports of German military victor)7 enhanced
by the use of propaganda. As the war progressed and there was less opportunity to report
military victory, the German leadership stimulated the civilian morale with promises of
retaliation and the reports of powerful secret weapons.' 8
In Japan, authorities did not enjoy the same amount of success in compensating
for the lower morale produced by the bombing. Propaganda was relatively effective in hiding
the true outcome of the Pacific War only until the initiation of the systematic Allied
bombing of the Japanese home islands. According to the USSBS, in contrast to Germany,
the Japanese leadership found it necessary to resort to a "variety of repressive and directive
controls over popular thought and feeling...."" The internal security forces were able to
prevent insurrection due, in a large measure, to the nature of Japanese society. Pre-war
Japan represented a homogeneous population. It was also highly militarized. After 1935,
the education system was transformed into a program of nationalist indoctrination for
Japanese youth. Even adherence to the national Shinto religion, with its tenets of Emperor-
worship and blind obedience to the state, was mandatory for all citizens;' In this social
setting, the USSBS reported that, "[the police force] operated in an aura of fear which was
sufficiently awe-inspiring to cover up obvious inadequacies of operation."71
67 Ibid., 42.
68 Ibid., 43 - 44.
69 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Pacific War, The Effects of Strategic
Bombing on Japanese Morale (Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1947), 4.
7t Ibid.
71 Ibid., 5.
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Applying the results of the USSBS to the targeting strategy of PD-59 may be
misleading. Both Germany and Japan represented homogeneous societies whose ruling
regime enjoyed legitimacy and support from the majority7 of the population. The Soviet
Union of the early 1980's did not share these traits and therefore may have been more
susceptible to internal fragmentation after an attack. .Also, the Allied bombing campaign was
waged over months and years, whereas a nuclear strike would be conducted in terms of
minutes and hours. This would negate any application of the USSBS findings of long-term
morale problems to the PD-59 targeting strategy. Even accounting for these differences,
however, the USSBS does provide some evidence that the unavoidable civilian casualties of
a counter-control nuclear strike would preclude any large scale uprising.7 1
A targeting strategy based on omnibalancing might also be criticized for the
number of civilian casualties it would create. In contrast to implementing the PD-59
targeting, however, an attack of a Third World dictator's mechanisms of internal control
would result in collateral damage of a much lower scale. This is because in a Third World
authoritarian regime, the economic and political systems are highly concentrated and easier
to disrupt than equivalent targets in the Soviet example. Since Third World dictators do not
enjoy the totalitarian control of the Soviet Union, there is no Third World equivalent of the
72 In a contrasting view, John A. Lauder uses the conclusions of the USSBS to argue
in favor of a counter-combatant targeting strategy which resembled the strategy of PD-59.
Lauder proposes that, while the USSBS indicated the limitations to expecting an internal
revolt after a nuclear attack, it also supported the "proposition that a nation's economic and
military capability can be destroyed by measures short of the destruction of its cities." The
means for successful implementation of the strategy is the selection of targets "of sufficient
size and isolation to be destroyed by a small nuclear weapon with minimum residual damage
to the civilian population." Unfortunately, Lauder does not specify how to meet this criteria.
John A. Lauder, "Lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey for Contemporary Defense
Policy," Orbis 18(Fall 1974): 777.
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Communist Party which influenced all aspects of Soviet society.73 A targeting strategy
designed to destroy the Communist control may well have become a counter-cities doctrine.
Selecting similar targets in Third World authoritarian states would result in a smaller and
more discriminate set. Therefore, the scale of unnecessary civilian casualties in the Third
World will be relatively much less than was argued in the criticism of PD-59.
The second argument of this section focuses on the reaction of the Soviet populace
assuming limited civilian casualties. This is a topic that concerned American strategists since
the late 1940's. At that time, some analysts believed an initial nuclear exchange would lead
to domestic revolt in the Soviet Union. 7 ' In 1949, at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and Secretary of Defense, an inter-service committee was formed to study this issue. 75 The
committee's final report stated, "Among an indeterminate minority, atomic bombing [of the
Soviet Union] might stimulate dissidence and the hope of relief from oppression. Unless and
until vastly more favorable opportunities develop for them, the influence of these elements
will not appreciably affect the Soviet war effort." 7 ' Though recognizing that a U.S. attack
would seriously degrade the Soviet war-waging capability, the committee concluded that
large scale domestic opposition to the Soviet regime could not be expected.
73 Jeane Kirkpatrick proposes that the most significant difference between Third World
authoritarian regimes and a totalitarian regime based on the Soviet model is the role of
ideology. The Communist Party was able to maintain tight control over Soviet society
through the manipulation of "national" ideology. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Security and
Latin America," Commentary 71 (January 19S1): 33.
74 Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy
,
106.
75 The committee is referred to as the Harmon Committee after its chairman, Air Force
Lieutenant General H. R. Harmon. "Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting
from the Strategic Air Offensive," in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, ed.,
Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945 - 1950 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1978), 360.
71 Etzold and Gaddis state that the Harmon Committee report was not well received
because it conflicted with the then current Air Force justification for increases in budgets
and numbers of aircraft. Etzold and Gaddis, 361.
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Critics of PD-59 also stressed that conditions in the Soviet Union after a nuclear
attack would not be conducive to a major domestic insurrection. The Soviet regime would
have control of such domestic necessities as food and medical supplies, transportation to
shelters and the shelters themselves. 77 Also, since it would be difficult for the population to
recognize the discriminatory nature of the U.S. strikes, domestic priorities would be focused
on survival rather than rebellion.78
The assumption of PD-59 that the Soviet population would instigate a domestic
revolt against the regime once the control mechanisms were attacked, is similar to the
assumption of a deterrence policy based on the theory of omnibalancing. While there is
some empirical evidence of Third World domestic response after the fall of a dictator, it
does not accurately model the regime destruction envisioned in a nuclear deterrence policy.
In addition, recent cases of military strikes against authoritarian regimes yield mixed results
in regards to domestic response. Nevertheless, both the empirical analysis and the actual
consequences of military action are useful to the understanding of the potential domestic
response in the Third World to a counter-control strike.
Richard Betts and Samuel Huntington empirically analyzed authoritarian Third
World regimes to determine whether the demise of the ruler in these nations would lead to
political instability. 7 ' They conclude that three factors contributed to political instability
after the death of the regime leader. These are: (1) a high level of pre-death instability; (2)
duration in power of 20 or more years; and (3) a high level of autonomous social
77 Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 231.
78 Ibid.
75 Richard K. Betts and Samuel P. Huntington, "Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs,"
International Security 10(Winter 19S5/86): 1 12 - 143. The criteria for regime selection was
authoritarian leaders in power for 10 or more years who died naturally or by accidental
causes between World War II and 1984. Eighteen cases met this criteria.
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organization. 8
c
Assuming this analysis is accurate, the factors influencing post-death
political instability are beyond the influence of external powers.
There is a critical difference, however, between a peaceful death of a ruler and the
destruction of a regime by external military power. Recent examples, while not providing
adequate data for analysis, present contrasting conclusions. One example is the 1986
American raid on Libya. According to David, "Although the main goal of the strike was to
deter further support of terrorism by Khadaffi, a clear secondary goal was to provoke a coup
against the Libyan leader." 81 George P. Shultz, Secretary of State during the Reagan
administration, revealed three days after the raid that the targets selected were influenced by
"a considerable dissidence in the armed forces in Libya with Qaddafi (sic) and what he's
doing." 82 When queried about the possibility7 of a post- attack coup, Shultz stated, "If a
coup takes place, that's all to the good." aa To spark a coup d'etat, the Americans struck
some of the targets that represented Khadaffi's internal mechanisms of suppression. These
included the elite guard forces, airfields, training camps, government buildings and
Khadaffi's barracks headquarters." At the same time, the Reagan administration attempted
to incite a coup through declarations and propaganda. 5
:
80 Ibid., 118 - 121.
81 David, Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security
,
58.
82
"Key Sections of Shultz Press Talk on Libya and Other Issues," New York Times
,
18 April 1986, A 10.
81 Ibid.
84 Mary Jane Deeb, Libya's Foreign Policy in North Africa (Boulder: Westview Press,
1991), 171.
85 Immediately after the raid, the Voice of America began broadcasting, in Arabic, calls
for the Libyan people to overthrow Khadaffi. David, Third World Coups d'Etat and
International Security
, 58.
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A coup, however, did not occur and Khadaffi remains in power. Immediately after
the raid, some analysts saw the attack as increasing support for Khadaffi's regime because
of involvement by American forces. 86 Another significant factor, explaining the lack of
domestic uprising was the civilian casualties as a result of the attack. 17
By contrast, in Iraq, the end of the Gulf War in March 1991 was marked by a
violent uprising which pitted several opposition groups against Hussein's Ba'ath Party."
Compared to the Libyan raid, estimates of Iraqi civilian casualties during the Gulf War range
upwards to tens of thousands. 85 Aside from the loss of life, the degradation of domestic
living conditions is many orders of magnitude higher than any damage caused by the attack
on Libya.50
Given the outcome of the Libyan and Iraqi cases, it is difficult to predict the
domestic response of a counter-control strike against a Third World regime. It is safe to
assume that many factors which may influence the outcome are beyond the control of the
external power. The result, however, may not be critical. For successful deterrence, it is
only important that the authoritarian leadership perceives that the targeting strategy poses
86 An unnamed Libyan opponent of Khaddafi stated, "The opposition has been put into
a corner by the American strikes. Any opposition member who is also a Libyan patriot
cannot come out publicly against Colonel Qaddafi (sic) without being tainted as a tool of
America." Elaine Sciolino, "Experts Assert Raid Will Stifle Libyan Opposition to Qaddafi,"
New York Times, 20 April 19S6, 112.
87 Deeb, 172.
81 See Ahmad Chalabi, "Iraq: The Past as Prologue?," Foreign Policy S3 (Summer
1991): 20; and Strobe Talbot, "Post-Victory Blues," Foreign Affairs 71 (No. 1 1992): 62 -
63.
85 A true estimate of Iraqi civilian casualties may never be known as it relies on Iraqi
sources which may not be reliable or capable of making an assessment. Hisham H. Ahmed.
"Iraq's Conduct of the Gulf Crisis," Arab Studies Quarterly 13(Winter/Spring 1991): 27 -
28.
80 Ibid., 28 - 29.
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a credible threat to its internal security. It is when deterrence fails that successful
implementation is required.
4. Lack of American Capability
Analysts have criticized PD-59 for what they perceive as an optimistic assessment
of the consequences of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. Michael Howard asks,
"[Wjhat would be going on here while the strategic strike forces of the United States were
conducting their carefully calibrated and controlled nuclear war?" 91 The targeting strategy
of PD-59 was intended to provide flexibility to the National Command Authority by
designing attack options other than a single massive nuclear strike. Yet, it can be argued
that any strategy limiting nuclear strikes is neither credible nor desirable if the Soviets could
retaliate massively.
Colin S. Gray states, "No matter how flexible U.S. strategic employment planning
may be, if it is not matched by some very significant ability actually to defend North
America, it would have to amount, in practice, to suicide on the installment plan."52 As
with the arguments over expected Soviet domestic response, this criticism is based on the
perceived situation of MAD and the Soviet second- strike capability. Flexibility in nuclear
targeting, in itself, is not advantageous as long as the Soviets retain the ability to strike at the
United States. Any targeting doctrine under these conditions, no matter how logically
conceived, would have little strategic value. It would not be credible as a deterrent threat
and could not be implemented if deterrence failed.53
91 Howard, 12.
52 Gray, "Targeting Problems for Central War," 7.
93 Jervis argues that American recognition that the Soviets could answer U. S. counter-
control strikes with similar attacks would deter the U. S. from executing the targeting
strategy of PD-59. Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy
,
74.
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In addition to the absence of an adequate defense system to counter Soviet nuclear
retaliation, the United States would be unable to launch enough warheads to cover the entire
PD-59 target base. The U.S. nuclear arsenal does not contain enough warheads accurate
enough to strike all of the types of targets designated by PD-59."
The target set of a Third World authoritarian regime is considerably smaller than
that of the Soviet Union. Therefore the criticism of PD-59 that the required target set is
larger than can be accommodated by the number of U.S. warheads does not apply to the
Third World." Regarding effective U.S. defensive capability, the Bush administration's
redefinition of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative into the Global Protection
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) is intended to address this issue in reference to ballistic
missiles."
A defensive capability represented by GPALS technology, however, cannot be
considered adequate for three reasons: (1) the improbability of complete effectiveness; (2)
the lagtime between the deployment of such a system and the realization of the ballistic
missile threat; and (3) the potential for non-ballistic missile nuclear threats.
The Bush administration emphasizes the performance of the U.S. .Army's Patriot
air defense system in the Gulf War as evidence that technology is available for effective
ballistic missile defenses. 37 The performance of the Patriot system, however, has been
criticized since the end of the Gulf War. Estimates of Patriot effectiveness against Iraqi
'< Ibid., 96 - 97.
?! It is beyond the scope of this discussion to argue the costs and benefits of utilizing
conventional versus unconventional weapons. The point emphasized here is that the U. S.
arsenal is capable of striking all selected targets in a Third World country.
M Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1-1
87 In his 1991 State of the Union message, Bush stated, "Now, with remarkable
technological advances like the Patriot missile, we can defend against ballistic missile attacks
aimed at innocent civilians." George Bush, "State of the Union 1991," Vital Speeches of the
Day
, 15 February 1991, 261.
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SCUD ballistic missiles range from 96 percent to 20 percent.96 If ballistic missiles are armed
with nuclear warheads, any defensive system less than completely effective may not be
adequate. As Steve Fetter argues, "Even a highly effective terminal defense is unlikely to
destroy more than 90 percent of incoming warheads, but if only one nuclear...warhead
penetrates the defenses of a city, thousands of people will die."' 9 Additionally, the primitive
nature of the Iraqi ballistic missiles precludes using the Gulf War experience as assurance
that missile defenses are technologically possible in the near term. 10 '
The second reason why American defense capabilities are deficient is the time it
will take to deploy a ballistic missile defense system. The Bush administration's goal is to
deploy surface-based theater defenses by the mid- 1990's.101 As with the performance of the
Patriot, the projected progress of GPALS has come under severe criticism. Accusations of
program mismanagement and improper testing practices imply that the deployment goal will
not be realized. 102 Regardless of when effective ballistic missile defenses are available, they
do not affect the present threat. More than 20 nations have ballistic missile capabilities or
58 The 96 percent estimate is from an initial post-war U.S. Army report. The 20 percent
figure is attributed to a leaked assessment by the Israel Defense Force. Theodore A. Postol,
"Lessons of the Gulf War Experience With Patriot," International Security 16 (Winter
1991/92): 134 - 135. It should be noted that the U. S. Army has revised its estimate during
Congressional testimony in April 1992, an Army spokesman reported a Patriot success rate
in Saudi Arabia and 40 percent in Israel. Eric Schmitt, "Patriots Downed Fewer Scuds, Army
Admits," New York Times, 8 April 1992, A9.
" Fetter, 39.
100 Postol, 171.
101 See Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1-9; and Glenn W. Goodman, Jr.,
"New Army Ballistic Missile Buster To Be Ready for Action in 1996," Armed Forces Journal
International (March 1992): 21 - 22.
102 See Aldric Saucier, "Lost in Space," New York Times, 9 March 1992, A15; and
William J. Broad, "Pentagon Stance on Space Arms Is Faulted by Agency of Congress," New
York Times
, 11 March 1992, A12.
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are trying to acquire them, including Iraq, Iran and Libya.101 While current Third World
capabilities are range-restricted to theater, rather than intercontinental, use this does not
alleviate the threat to forward deployed U.S. military' forces. 1 ' 4
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the third reason why defenses are not
adequate is that a system such as GPALS will not address the variety of nuclear delivery
systems available to potential Third World aggressors. According to Fetter:
[Any] country sophisticated enough to develop ICBMs could certainly
find other ways to deliver nuclear weapons if faced with an effective
missile defense. Indeed, cruise missiles - about which SDI-type systems
can do very little - may...prove to be far more effective delivery systems
for emerging nuclear.. .arsenals than ballistic missiles. 1C!
Therefore, ballistic missile defenses will only solve part of the defensive problem.
The preceding discussion indicates that the lack of U.S. defenses is a valid criticism
of any nuclear deterrence policy aimed at Third World dictators. Unlike the case of PD-
59, however, the lack of a survivable Third World second-strike capability precludes the
deficient .American defenses from invalidating a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing.
C. CONCLUSION
A deterrence strategy based on the theory of omnibalancing and Presidential Directive
59 are both predicated on the assumption that the targeted regimes place great value on the
10
J
W. Seth Cams, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response , The
Washington Papers No. 146 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 12.
1,4 This range limitation is not insignificant especially as it effects two related issues not
covered in this discussion: extended deterrence and coalition support. Steve Fetter argues
that had Iraq developed the capability to launch ballistic missiles against Paris or London,
France and Great Britain may not have supported the Gulf War effort. Fetter, 28.
10i Fetter, 39. See also Kosta Tsipis, "Offshore Threat - Cruise Missiles," New York
Times
,
1 April 1992, A21. For an analysis of the effect of cruise missile proliferation on U.S.
Navy operations, see Science Applications International Corporation for Defense Nuclear
Agency, Missile Non-Proliferation: Implications for the United States Navy , 22 January
1990.
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maintenance of their internal mechanisms of control. Targeting strategies derived from this
assumption threaten the means by which these regimes, whether in the Third World or
Soviet Union, secure their base of power. Criticisms of PD-59 are therefore relevant in
evaluating the potential of omnibalancing to serve as the basis of a Third World deterrence
strategy.
Much of the criticism of PD-59 was based on the existence of a Soviet nuclear second-
strike capability. In the perceived situation of MAD, the undefendable vulnerability of
American society to Soviet attack invalidated a U.S. counter-control targeting strategy. Not
only would the elimination of Soviet internal control affect war termination and conflict de-
escalation, the very fact that the Soviets had the ability to counter-attack made any U.S.
targeting strategy inherently incredible. Authoritarian regimes in the Third World, however,
do not possess an intercontinental nuclear second-strike capability. Therefore, the criticisms
of PD-59 that questioned the desirability of a counter-control strategy, or that emphasized
a lack of defenses are not applicable to a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing.
The implementation of PD-59 was also criticized because of a lack of required
intelligence support for targeting. Recent Third World conflicts reveal a similar deficiency
in intelligence. The nature of authoritarian regimes, however, indicates that American
intelligence shortfalls are the result of a lack of dedicated resources, rather than the
difficulty of collection. Therefore, while it is recognized as a valid criticism of a counter-
control strategy against Third World authoritarian regimes, deficient targeting intelligence
can be corrected. It does not invalidate the use of omnibalancing for deterrence.
The differences between Third World dictatorships and the Soviet Union also negate
the criticisms of PD-59 regarding the unmanageable size of the target set and the expected
amount of civilian casualties. A criticism that is applicable to a deterrence policy based on
omnibalancing is the argument disputing the predicted reaction of the Soviet population.
Recent U.S. military conflicts with Third World dictatorships indicate mixed responses from
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the population. It should be re-emphasized that the domestic response is only critical if
deterrence fails. It is only the perception of the authoritarian leadership that is significant
for successful deterrence and there is evidence that this leadership is influenced by threats
to its internal control. The case of deterrence failure will be addressed in the concluding
chapter.
After comparing PD-59 with a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing, it is evident
that the majority of the criticisms of PD-59 are not applicable to deterring Third World
authoritarian states. Assuming that the theory of omnibalancing is an accurate description
of Third World regime behavior, it appears logical that a targeting strategy similar to that of
PD-59 could result in a viable deterrence policy.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
With the end of the Cold War and the potential for reduced tension between the United
States and the former Soviet Union, there is little likelihood of nuclear warfare between the
superpowers. The recent war in the Middle East and the current focus on the security
threat of nuclear proliferation, however, has introduced a requirement for a different
emphasis in nuclear deterrence. The preceding analysis is a first step in the development of
a deterrence policy aimed at authoritarian regimes in the Third World armed with nuclear
weapons.
A review of the concept of deterrence, reveals that the coercive strategies applicable
to deterring Third World nuclear use are those of denial and punishment. A denial strategy
is defensive in nature. The United States needs technological solutions to the defensive
problem, such as GPALS in the case of ballistic missile delivery systems, in combination with
conventional preemptive attacks against Third World nuclear capabilities. The coercive
strategy of punishment must threaten the value system of the targeted regime. The
development of this punishment threat has been the focus of this study.
It is assumed that the decision-making of the authoritarian leaders is influenced by
the factors described in Steven David's theory of omnibalancing. Specifically, these regimes
perceive that their base of power is vulnerable to internal security threats. A deterrence
policy based on a punishment strategy must take advantage of this perception by targeting
the mechanisms on which the regime relies for internal control. Two methods of internal
control are significant: suppression and economic distribution.
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The most common means of suppressing internal opposition is the use of elite security
forces. Since they are included in the regime's core following, their loyalty can be assumed
to be high. The regime leadership depends on these forces not only to counter domestic
civilian unrest but also to suppress any potential rebellion in the general military forces.
Targeting the control mechanism of suppression translates into threatening to destroy the
elite forces and the command and control network connecting these forces to the regime's
leadership.
Economic distribution as a control mechanism refers to the use of monetary rewards
to ensure loyalty with the implied threat of interruption of financial benefits for disloyal
behavior. This method of control obviously requires a constant flow of wealth to the regime
for subsequent payments. For the majority of Third World nations, this source of revenue
is derived from few, if not just one, export product. Targeting the means of economic
distribution translates into attacks on the source, storage or transportation facilities related
to exports. While threatened destruction of the source of a primary export may be the most
efficient means of interrupting the dictatorship's income, it may not be politically feasible,
especially if the export is a strategic resource for the United States or its allies. Petroleum
products are one example of an export product that would probably not be targeted.
Two obstacles to threatening a regime's internal control mechanisms have been
presented. The first is the inclination of Third World leaders to externalize a threat to their
internal security. This may result in an escalation of conflict rather than a successful
deterrence situation. The second obstacle is the phenomenon of the scapegoat war. The
regime leadership can utilize the defender's deterrent threat to rally any internal opposition
over to the dictator's side against a recognizable external foe. Both of these situations
present difficulties in threatening internal control.
If implemented, a deterrence policy based on the theory of omnibalancing shares
similarities with the arguments stated by advocates of the Carter administration's justification
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for the nuclear targeting shift codified by PD-59. Therefore, the criticisms of PD-59 serve
as an applicable test of the viability of omnibalancing for deterrence.
An analysis of the requirements for PD-59 revealed a critical intelligence failure in the
U.S. capability for locating counter-control targets. While recent examples of U.S.
interventions in the Third World demonstrated similar shortcomings, the characteristics
inherent in Third World nations indicate that associated intelligence failures are more
dependent upon a lack of committed resources rather than on the nature of the problem.
Third World borders are readily penetrated by technical or human intelligence assets.
Additionally, the control structure in Third World dictatorships is indicative of an
authoritarian regime but not a totalitarian system based on the Soviet model. In other
words, the internal control is not entrenched into every aspect of Third World society and
can therefore be more readily isolated and identified than could the control mechanisms of
the former Soviet Union. This fact also addresses the criticism of PD-59 that because of
the number of Soviet targets identified, implementation would result in a counter- cities
attack. In the case of a Third World regime, the size of a counter- control target set is
relatively smaller and more discriminate. Therefore the scale of Chilian casualties and
collateral damage in the Third World will be less than was argued concerning PD-59.
The targeting strategy of PD-59 was also criticized for its questionable assumption
that once the internal control mechanisms were destroyed, the population would rise up to
overthrow the Soviet regime. This criticism may have validity regarding the Third World.
Analyses of American attacks on Libya and Iraq demonstrate the difficulty in predicting
Third World domestic responses to military strikes against the regime. As a threat, however,
deterrence addresses the perceptions of the regime leadership rather than the desires of the
population. In this regard, there is substantial evidence that Third World leaders behave and
make decisions in accordance with the theory of omnibalancing. Therefore, for the
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maintenance of deterrence, threatening the possibility for revolt becomes more significant
than the potential for actual rebellion.
Finally, critics of PD-59 argue that the targeting requirements were beyond the actual
U.S. military capability to implement. Additionally, a lack of defense against a Soviet
counter- strike in a situation of MAD made deterrence incredible. Third World regimes do
not possess a secure second-strike capability against the United States. The relatively small
size of Third World nations, the concentration of control mechanisms of suppression and
economic distribution in a handful of cities, and vulnerable nuclear deliver}7 systems result
in a targeting strategy that is well within present U.S. capabilities.
B. CONCLUSIONS
A deterrence policy based on omnibalancing targets what Third World regimes value
the most: the mechanisms of internal control. By applying this strategy, the United States
would threaten the overthrow of the aggressor regime through the destruction of these
control mechanisms. There are three conclusions that can be drawn from the development
of a deterrence policy based on this concept: (1) wars waged by the United States against
Third World nuclear powers should be restricted to limited objectives; (2) the distinction
between declaratory policy and employment policy will likely be significant if deterrence fails;
and (3) the Third World perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons can lead to a
situation of mutual deterrence. The first two conclusions affect war-fighting strategies and
the last is critical to an understanding of crisis stability.
1. Limited Objectives of War
A punishment strategy based on omnibalancing is predicated on an aggressor's
decision that the costs of using nuclear weapons outweigh any perceived benefits. Since the
need to deter Third World nuclear use remains necessary even after hostilities commence,
a deterrence policy must be applicable to both pre-war and intra-war deterrence situations.
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Intra-war deterrence will occur if the aggressor is convinced that his regime will not be
destroyed as long as he does not employ nuclear weapons. Intra-war nuclear deterrence,
therefore, will only succeed when the United States enters a conflict with declared limited
objectives. If, in contrast, the United States is committed to a total victory over the
aggressor, the Third World regime could plausibly conclude that the costs of using nuclear
weapons were no different than not using them. Under these circumstances, the Third
World dictatorship would only be influenced by perceived benefits of nuclear use.
The argument regarding limited objectives is more applicable to declaratory rather
than to action signalling. Military actions in modem warfare, as demonstrated during the
Gulf War, can blur the distinction between limited and total war. The citizens of Baghdad,
for example, may not have appreciated the fact that coalition forces selected their targets
carefully. Therefore, it is critical that the aggressor receives clear and unambiguous
declaratory signals concerning the U.S. war objectives.
2. Declaratory vs. Employment Policy
One criticism of PD-59 was that the Soviet population may not have responded in
the manner assumed by the strategy. This may also be a valid criticism of omnibalancing.
Recent Third World conflicts are inconclusive regarding a potential domestic response to a
counter-control strike. This is an irrelevant point as long as the Third World leadership is
convinced that its regime security is credibly threatened and. therefore, does not challenge
the deterrent threat. The response of the Third World population, however, will be
significant if deterrence fails.
According T ^ a declarator}7 deterrence policy based on omnibalancing, if deterrence
failed and a Third World nuclear attack took place, the United States would destroy the
mechanisms of internal regime control. This implies a need to minimize civilian casualties
in the counter-control strikes. It would be critical to spare the source of regime opposition
from excessive suffering. This requirement would influence the actual selection of targets
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and weapons to ensure minimal collateral damage. One drawback of this discriminate
targeting, however, is that the regime's leadership might not be destroyed in the attack.
Additionally, since it cannot be assumed with assurance that internal opposition would
overthrow the Third World regime, there is a possibility that the regime could survive. The
survival of the dictatorship after a counter-control strike would leave the United States with
no targets of sufficient value to hold at risk in order to reestablish deterrence. This situation
would appear the same to the Third World leadership as if the United States entered the
conflict committed to total war. In other words, after an unsuccessful U.S. strike, the
leadership would perceive no relative costs to continued nuclear use. Another consequence
of this situation is that other nuclear Third World powers might draw a critical lesson about
the lack of U.S. capabilities or willingness to threaten their existence.
This discussion of deterrence failure is not meant to question the utility of
omnibalancing as a basis for deterrence. It does suggest, however, that there would be a
need to reevaluate target selection if deterrence fails. WTiile the deterrent threat may be
predicated on ensuring the regime's domestic opposition survives the strike, the objectives
of the employment policy would be to ensure the regime does not survive. A conflict exists
between declaratory policy and employment policy because it may not be possible to use the
force necessary to guarantee regime destruction and still limit civilian casualties and
collateral damage. In a sense, this conflict resembles the charge that PD-59 would actually
result in a counter-cities strategy. But Third World nations, unlike the former Soviet Union,
do not possess a second-strike capability which renders a counter-cities strike suicidal for
the United States. Thus, the U.S. employment policy against a Third World dictatorship is
not hindered by concern of retaliation.
3. Mutual Deterrence
The last conclusion refers to the possible Third World perceptions of nuclear
deterrence and omnibalancing. Many of the preceding arguments were justified through
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anecdotal evidence of U.S. experiences in Third World conflicts. But authoritarian leaders
in potential nuclear nations may have also learned lessons from these events. One critical
lesson dictators may have learned is that their regimes can survive armed conflicts with the
United States. It has been six years since American aircraft bombed Libya and Muammar
Khadaffi is still secure in his power. While it may be too soon after the Gulf War to make
a prediction of Saddam Hussein's longevity, it is clear that his potential demise will not be
directly attributed to the coalition military attacks. But while Hussein may have studied
Khadaffi's experience battling the United States, recent events in the Persian Gulf are more
significant in regards to future nuclear deterrence. Statements Hussein made before and
during the war indicate his perception that he could use the threat of chemical warfare to
ensure his survival. If this is true, then Hussein and others like him may see nuclear
weapons as even more of a guarantor of their security.
It has already been concluded that the United States would be restricted to
declared limited objectives in a conflict wit 1 a Third World nuclear power. If the regime
used its nuclear weapons as a deterrent against U.S. counter-control strikes, there may
emerge an inherent stability in potential crises. In this hypothetical situation, the counter-
control threats of the United States would reinforce the need for the Third World
authoritarian regime to threaten nuclear use against the United States to guarantee its
survival. The result would be a potential situation of mutual deterrence, the stability of
which would depend in a large measure on how well each side communicated their threats
and intentions. Based solely on a superficial analysis of declaratory threats, the Gulf War
experience could be interpreted as a situation of mutual deterrence. President Bush clearly
stated that the overthrow of the Ba'athist regime was not an objective of the war, but he also
threatened terrible personal consequences for Hussein if chemical weapons were used. At
the same time, Hussein apparently threatened chemical use if his regime was directly
attacked. Both threats complemented the other and might have contributed to the mutual
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desire not to challenge either one. This example of mutual deterrence reveals a stability-
instability paradox. 1 While the threat of Iraqi chemical use may have protected Hussein's
power, it did not prevent the coalition from achieving limited military objectives with
conventional weapons. This depiction of the deterrence policies in the Gulf War is
admittedly only one of many possible interpretations of the decision-making processes of
Iraqi and U.S. leaders. The value of the Gulf War experience for understanding future
deterrence situations may, therefore, be limited.
All of these conclusions indicate that formulating a nuclear deterrence policy aimed
at the emerging threat of Third World nuclear nations is a complex and uncertain process.
This research and the theory of omnibalancing serve as initial steps in the eventual choice
of a targeting strategy for deterrence. Neither nuclear proliferation nor regional aggression
will discontinue in the foreseeable future. The United States must be prepared to deter a
potential Third World nuclear power hostile to its interests or those of its allies and friends.
It cannot be assumed that the apparent success of superpower nuclear deterrence can be
transferred to situations in the Third World.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Having reviewed the findings of this study and offered conclusions, some discussion
should also be given to two aspects of nuclear deterrence against Third World regimes that
have not been covered: the utility of the U.S. nuclear weapons; and the applicability of
omnibalancing to third party deterrence. Both of these topics require further study. The
following discussion is meant merely to indicate the importance of these issues.
1 Glenn Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul Seabury,
ed., The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 1S4 - 201. See also Jervis, The
Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy , 29 - 34.
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1. The Utility of U.S. Nuclear Weapons
The theory of omnibalancing has presented a basis for a targeting strategy to deter
Third World authoritarian regimes. The discussion of omnibalancing has not indicated a
preference for a particular weapons system to implement the threatened response. Nuclear
deterrence policies directed at the former Soviet Union, such as PD-59, were developed with
an assumption of nuclear use by the United States. The question, in regards to deterring
Third World aggressors, is whether the threatened use of nuclear weapons enhances
deterrence.
President Bush, in a national address on 27 September 1991, announced a radical
reduction of the U.S. nuclear force posture. 2 This reduction included: the elimination of
ground-launched short range nuclear weapons; the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons
from naval ships and land-based naval aircraft; the stand-down of all alert strategic bombers
and the termination of the development of mobile ICBM's and air-launched short range
attack missiles. 3 These reductions of nuclear forces were enacted in reaction to the turmoil
that was then present in the Soviet Union. The Bush administration hoped to influence
President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin to reciprocate with similar
Soviet reductions. The removal of tactical nuclear weapons, however, has meant that the
United States must rely on strategic nuclear systems for immediate deterrence. It is not
obvious whether the use of intercontinental nuclear weapons would result in a credible threat
in a Third World deterrence situation.
John Deutsch, a former Undersecretary of Energy, suggests that Bush's arms
control initiatives have produced a non-credible threat:
Theater nuclear weapons have perhaps their most significant role in
deterring regional conflicts and the use of nuclear, chemical and
2 George Bush, "Initiative on Nuclear Arms," Vital Speeches of the Day
. (1 November
1991): 34 - 36.
J Ibid., 35.
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biological weapons. I therefore believe that President Bush acted
unwisely in removing tactical nuclear weapons from ships and
submarines.... 4
Deutsch did not provide justifications for his premise but one possible explanation is that
the relatively enormous yield of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons would represent a
disproportionate amount of damage in response to a Third World nuclear attack. The
magnitude of such an asymmetrical counter- strike may render it non-credible as a
threatened response. 5
The Department of Defense has apparently taken the opposite view and seems
satisfied with the deterrent effect of intercontinental systems. Secretary Cheney, in his 1992
Report to Congress, stated:
Strategic nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role with respect
to countries other than the former Soviet Union.... Other
cnunUies...threaten to acquire [nuclear weapons]. This requires the
continued reliance on a secure retaliatory capability to deter their use.'
Cheney's statement implies his acceptance in the ability for intercontinental systems to deter
Third World dictatorships.
The statements of both Deutsch and Cheney are similar in that they indicate a
perception that nuclear weapons are required for deterring nuclear use. It is not obvious
that targeting the mechanisms of internal control of a Third World regime requires the use
of nuclear weapons. The Gulf War has served as a showcase for the effectiveness of
conventional, high-yield, precision-guided munitions. The use of conventional warheads
4 John M. Deutsch, "Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order," Technology Review
(February/March 1992): 6S.
5 Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II, "Countering the Threat of the Well-
Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons," Strategic Review 19 (Fall
1991): 36. Dowler and Howard recommend the development of low-yield nuclear weapons
termed "micro-nukes" as a solution to the threat credibility7 problem.
1 Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the
Congress, February 1992
,
7.
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in a punishment strategy would alleviate any reluctance U.S. decision-makers might have
to respond if faced with only the option of employing nuclear weapons. Conventional
weapons also have potential utility for a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing to prevent
Third World use of chemical or biological weapons.
While omnibalancing forms a basis for a deterrence policy, it is evident that more
research is required to determine the optimum weapon system for its implementation. It is
not intuitively clear whether or not U.S. nuclear weapons are essential to satisfy the
requirements of a credible deterrent threat.
2. The Applicability of Omnibalancing to Third Party Deterrence
The discussion of deterring Third World regimes from using nuclear weapons has
been focused on potential conflict situations involving the United States or its allies. But,
if nuclear proliferation continues, another nuclear scenario is likely: a conflict between two
Third World nuclear-armed nations which does not directly involve the United States. The
United States, in the role of a third party, may wish to remain neutral in this confrontation.
The United States, however, may also desire to intervene to prevent either side from using
nuclear arms. This latter situation can be described as "third party" deterrence.
A draft copy of the Defense Department's Defense Planning Guidance for the
Fiscal Years 1994 - 1999 indicates that a role for the U.S. military in third party deterrence
is being considered:
[T]he actual use of weapons of mass destruction, even in conflicts that
otherwise do not directly engage U.S. interests, could spur further
proliferation which in turn would threaten world order. The U.S. may be
faced with the question of whether to take military steps to prevent
the. ..use of weapons of mass destruction.. .[These steps include
preemption] or punishing the attackers or threatening punishment of
aggressors....7
7 Patrick E. Tyler, "U. S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New
York Times
,
8 March 1992, A14. The Defense Planning Guidance is a classified document
so it may be some time before the final draft is available for comparison. This early version
was allegedly leaked to promote public discussion of its central points.
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This potential use of U.S. forces makes it even more important to determine whether
omnibalancing is applicable to third party deterrence.
Scenarios of conflict between nuclear-capable Third World nations are not
implausible or difficult to imagine. India and Pakistan, both recognized as possessing
nuclear capabilities, have fought three wars in the last three decades and came very close to
a fourth in 1990.* Leonard Spector speculates that if hostilities do break out between these
nations, there is a possibility that the conflict might escalate to nuclear war. 5 Similar
scenarios could be envisioned either between India and China or between Israel and a future
nuclear-armed Arab state. 1 ' Another possibility is a potential nuclear war between former
Soviet republics. While the republics have agreed to transfer all nuclear weapons to the
territory of the Russian Federation, the Ukraine halted shipments in March 1992. 11 Because
the Ukraine has been in a political conflict with Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, this act raised speculation about the Ukrainian leadership's true intentions regarding
nuclear capabilities. Additionally, although Western analysts concluded that all tactical
nuclear weapons had been removed from outlying republics in January 1992, 12 in March
8
"Indian and Pakistani Troops Exchange Gunfire in Kashmir," New York Times
, 21
February' 1990. A5.
5 Leonard S. Spector, "India-Pakistan War: It Could be Nuclear," New York Times
,
7 June 1990. A 23.
10 See Robert E. Harkavy, "After the Gulf War: The Future of Israeli Nuclear
Deterrence," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1991): 161 - 179; and Brahma Chellaney,
"South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 48 -
51. In a Middle East scenario it is unlikely that the United States could maintain a neutral
posture in regards to Israel. It would not be implausible, however, for the United States to
restrain from assisting militarily unless nuclear use was threatened.
11 Serge Schmemann, "Ukraine Halting A-Arms Shift to Russia," New York Times , 13
March 1992, A3.
12 Allegedly, by January 1992 all former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons had been
transferred to storage facilities in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Robert S. Norris, "The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago," Arms Control Today 22
(January/February 1992): 24 - 25
US
1992, it was reported that there were nuclear weapons still stored in the republics of Armenia
and .Azerbaijan. 13 The fact that these two republics have been fighting for four years
conjures up worrisome scenarios about unauthorized acquisition of these weapons.
There are difficulties applying a targeting strategy based on omnibalancing to third
party deterrence. One problem is that some of the potential nuclear nations, such as India,
do not resemble the authoritarian regimes described in this study. In those cases, therefore,
it cannot be assumed that omnibalancing will accurately describe the regime's value system.
Another problem is an inherent lack of credibility for the United States, as a third party, to
threaten military intervention of the scale proposed by a punishment strategy. Finally, as in
the case of Israel, the United States may not enjoy the political freedom to maintain an
unconstrained deterrence policy. In consideration of these drawbacks, it is apparent that
further analysis must be performed before developing a U.S. third party deterrence policy.
15 The weapons are reportedly under centralized control of the forces of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. "Armenian Says 10 Hostage Officers Will be Freed,"
New York Times
, 12 March 1992, A6.
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